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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis seeks to determine how the United States should facilitate and advise 
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) regarding local Afghan 
security forces. Through in-depth analysis of relevant case studies (Afghan Local Police, 
Indian Territorial Army, Peruvian Rondas Campesinas, Afghan Arbakai), this thesis 
gleans critical lessons, positive and negative, to inform the development of an appropriate 
local security program for modern-day Afghan society. Given Afghanistan’s tribal nature, 
challenging geography, and the inability of GIRoA to secure its population with national 
forces, there is a need for effective local security elements that can protect their 
communities without challenging the survival of the central government. When 
developing local security elements, GIRoA should incorporate traditional governance, 
establish an appropriate link between local security elements and the military, and adapt 
force structures to judiciously selected areas. Additionally, GIRoA should create training 
and employment regimens for local security elements that preserve their intended use as 
small, defensive forces and impose minimal disruption to community life. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
When the United States intervened in Afghanistan in 2001, it did so in the middle 
of a civil war between tribal militias led by regional powerbrokers and the Taliban, which 
brutally sought to maintain strict control over the Afghan people. Following the rapid 
toppling of the Taliban by a small contingent of American Special Forces and intelligence 
operatives partnered with Afghan guerrilla elements, the United States, NATO, and the 
United Nations assisted in the establishment of a transitional central government.1 
Potentially counter to the tribal nature of Afghan society, the United States and its allies 
shaped the fledgling Afghan government and its security forces into organizations 
resembling its own composition.2 After seventeen years of sustained combat, the United 
States continues to commit troops and resources in an ongoing effort to achieve a stable 
Afghanistan free of insurgent and terror organizations.  
Afghanistan remains a predominantly rural and tribal society with a long history of 
militias and warlords that have both stabilized and disrupted regions of the country.3 As 
recently as America’s involvement during the War on Terror, Afghanistan endured 
multiple militia-based security programs, with varying levels of success. The development 
of local security forces is not without risk. There exists legitimate concern about shifting 
loyalties and co-optation of forces by warlords to create militias for personal gain. For a  
 
 
                                                 
1 Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed, A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the 
Road Ahead in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 5, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a577629.pdf. 
2 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Reconstructing the Afghan National 
Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (Arlington, CA: SIGAR, 
September 2017), 168. 
3 Jonathan Goodhand and Aziz Hakimi, “Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in 
Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 6, 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2013/12/counterinsurgency-local-militias-and-statebuilding-afghanistan. 
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security solution to achieve some level of effectiveness, it will have to address, or at least 
consider, the will of the people, the tolerance of the Afghan government, the interests of 
the United States, and the tribal nature of Afghan society. This thesis seeks to evaluate the 
potential benefits and challenges of local security initiatives and will make 
recommendations for employment to complement Afghanistan’s formal security structure 
and maintain the confidence of the Afghan people.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
How should the United States facilitate and advise the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) regarding local Afghan security forces? 
(1) What factors brought about the failure of previous local security attempts? 
(2) What control measures must exist for a local security program to remain 
resilient to corruption, misuse by local power brokers, or being co-opted by 
GIRoA’s adversaries?  
(3) Can GIRoA decentralize security efforts and maintain a legitimate central 
government? 
(4) What conditions are necessary for successful implementation of a local 
security program? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Through in-depth analysis of relevant case studies, this thesis intends to glean 
critical lessons learned, positive and negative, to determine whether a version of local 
security is indeed an appropriate solution for modern-day Afghan society. This thesis will 
primarily focus upon four case relevant comparative studies: the Afghan Local Police 






Since its creation under the guidance and resourcing of United States Special 
Operations Forces in 2010, the ALP has become a permanent and controversial entity of 
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.4 Despite isolated examples of success, 
research overwhelmingly paints the ALP as a largely ineffective organization more likely 
to abuse rather than protect the local population.5 This case study will provide insight into 
the challenges and shortcomings of pursuing a local security initiative. Understanding the 
faults of the ALP may highlight issues unique to Afghanistan in the context of culture and 
social dynamics. Furthermore, studying the ALP should prove particularly valuable, 
considering the organization still exists today. Any proposed solution, therefore, will enter 
an environment plagued with the same ongoing challenges confronting the ALP. Given the 
ALP became operational over eight years ago, there are many examples of deficiencies and 
attempted fixes on the part of the Afghan government and its American advisors that may 
inform future attempts to either shape the organization or abandon it in favor of a new 
solution.  
The decision to analyze the Indian Territorial Army as a case study stems from 
ongoing efforts to create a similar organization in Afghanistan, currently referred to as the 
Afghan National Army Territorial Force (ANATF). The Indian Territorial Army was a 
home defense force created by the British in India to augment security while troops were 
committed to World War I.6 Because the ANATF concept is still in the developmental 
stage, there is value for this thesis to continue with an objective analysis to influence the  
 
 
                                                 
4 International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” Asia Report, 268 (4 June 2015): 
i, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/future-afghan-local-police. 
5 International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” ii. 
6 T. A. Heathcote, The Military in British India: The Development of British Land Forces in South Asia 





ANATF’s proper implementation, validate the existing plan for the program, or refute the 
concept altogether. A study of the Indian Territorial Army will not only provide an example 
for developing such an organization’s structure and roles, but will also aid in identifying 
whether the program can be successful. More importantly, further study of both the Indian 
Territorial Army and Afghanistan may help determine what elements of the program are 
transferable to Afghanistan, if any. Mimicking a program that worked in a different culture 
and different time period may prove problematic if not thoroughly and honestly assessed.  
The third case study analyzes the Peruvian rondas campesinas, which are 
traditional local security elements that have provided protection and justice in rural 
communities for centuries.7 Specifically, this study will focus on the rondas’ role in 
defeating the Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (Communist Party of Peru-
Shining Path), a Maoist insurgent organization that was most active in Peru between 1980 
and 1995.8 Though culturally distinct from Afghanistan, Peru’s situation during this 
timeframe was similar in that the country faced a protracted insurgency with a central 
government struggling to control its rural regions. This case study will address the long-
term consequences of creating militias without proper control measures in place, as well as 
consider the value of working through existing traditional security structures. Analyzing 
the effective employment and associated challenges of the rondas may inform future 
decisions in Afghanistan regarding incorporation of traditional local security elements into 





                                                 
7 German Nuñez Palomino, “The Rise of the Rondas Campesinas in Peru,” The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 28, no. 36 (1996): 112, https://doi.org/10.1080/07329113.1996.10756468. 
8 David Scott Palmer, “Countering Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Shining Path in Peru,” 
Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, edited by James J. F. Forest, Vol. 3: Lessons 
from the Fight Against Terrorism. International Perspectives (1996): 293. 
5 
The final case study seeks to draw lessons from previous unofficial local security 
organizations inside of Afghanistan. There are myriad examples spanning Afghanistan’s 
history of formal and informal local defense forces, to include the arbakai.9 By evaluating 
Afghanistan’s arbakai, it may be possible to determine what previously worked within 
specific factions of Afghan culture. Given the ethnic and tribal diversity of Afghanistan, a 
blanket approach to security that the majority of the population will accept and consider 
legitimate may not be feasible. This study will assess cultural and environmental 
commonalities between successful arbakai elements to inform decisions for the potential 
employment or support of similar Afghan local security elements.  
To guide analysis and provide structure for comparison, this thesis will examine 
each case study utilizing established evaluation criteria. The subjects of each case study 
are assessed against the following categories: security/effectiveness, popular support, 
sustainability, government control, and criminal activity. Security and effectiveness speak 
to the capabilities and proficiency of the security force, as well as the security of the area 
within the context of the threat it faces. Popular support assesses the attitudes and actions 
of the communities toward the security force. Sustainability is a key consideration for 
evaluating a local security element. Determining if a resource-constrained nation like 
Afghanistan is capable of maintaining the security program, regardless of external support, 
may affect implementation. The level of government control considers how regulated a 
local security element is and if it strictly takes orders and guidance from the government. 
Finally, assessing the criminal activity level may establish whether or not a security 
element is doing more harm than good to the community it is charged with serving. Table 




                                                 
9 Dee Dee Derksen, “The Politics of Disarmament and Rearmament in Afghanistan,” United States 
Institute of Peace, Peaceworks, 110 (2015): 37, https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/politics-
disarmament-and-rearmament-afghanistan. 
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Table 1. Analytical framework for assessing local security elements. 
Criteria: Poor Acceptable Desired 
Security/ 
Effectiveness 
• Little impact on enemy 
• Inactive/fails to address 
threats 
• Security contested, 
but local security 
element is active 
• Area free of enemy 
activity 





• People fearful of local 
security element 
• Provides support only if 
coerced 
• Grievances brought 
directly to distant 
government entities or 
other informal militias 
• Members contribute little 
to their community outside 
of operations 
• People accept local 
security element’s 
function and 
tolerate its presence 
• People seek 
assistance only in 
emergencies 
• Members are a mix 
of full and part-time 
• People regularly 
report issues/request 
help 
• Members are part of 
their communities; 
local security is an 
additional activity 
Sustainability • Poor equipment 
accountability and 
maintenance  
• Poor recruiting 








• Low cost 
• Adequate tactical and 




• Local security element 
serves local/individual 
interests first 




still uses power for 
local objectives 
• Government control 
measures are in place 
to ensure proper 
function 




• Rampant abuse of 
population/predatory 
behavior 
• Minimal predatory 
behavior; legal 
system works to 
punish violations 








D. CHAPTER OVERVIEWS AND FINDINGS 
1. Literature Review—Militias and Local Security in Afghanistan 
The literature review discusses existing research surrounding Afghanistan’s history 
of militia-based security as well as recent efforts to implement local security programs. 
This chapter summarizes arguments for both supporters and critics of employing local 
security elements in Afghanistan. Those in favor of local security view it as an inevitability 
given the country’s tribal nature and widespread tradition of community defense. 
Opponents, however, focus upon the inherent challenges of government control and the 
risk of misbehavior.  
2. Case Study—Afghan Local Police 
This chapter provides a background for the Afghan Local Police program and 
considers the advantages and risks of the current model. Analysis of the program reveals 
how the failure to develop accountability mechanisms led to misbehavior and a lack of 
government control. The varying degrees of effectiveness for ALP elements also highlights 
the need to consider security and cultural factors when selecting areas to develop such a 
program.  
3. Case Study—Indian Territorial Army 
Studying the Indian Territorial Army’s history and structure presents a positive 
example of local security employment. Analysis of both the successes and challenges of 
the ITA produced valuable lessons for local security program development. The ITA’s 
experience emphasizes the need to establish durable control measures at the outset of a 
local security element’s creation, as well as the advantages of enforcing part-time service 
for its members to minimize social disruption. The ITA also demonstrates the value of 
regular security forces enhancing local security element capabilities through consistent 
standardized training.  
4. Case Study—Peruvian Rondas Campesinas 
This chapter considers the effective employment of the Peruvian rondas 
campesinas and draws parallels to the histories of local security in both Peru and 
8 
Afghanistan. The rondas contribution to defeating the Shining Path emphasizes the 
criticality of a government establishing a link to enhance effectiveness, provide support, 
and influence behavior. Analysis of the rondas, however, also illuminates the detrimental 
long-term effects of government-sponsored local security elements upon traditional 
societies.  
5. Case Study—Afghan Arbakai 
This case study looks to historical and recent examples of traditional security in 
Afghanistan to provide insight into a security model that accommodates Afghan culture. 
Studying the arbakai reveals the importance of working through traditional governance to 
influence local security element employment and bolster accountability while preserving 
their legitimacy. Furthermore, this case study highlights the need to consider the security 
situation and customs of a specific area prior to developing a local security element.  
6. Conclusion and Recommendations  
Analysis of local security elements from distinct cultures and times produced 
critical lessons for the development of community defense programs in Afghanistan. This 
study identified the need for GIRoA to incorporate traditional governance, establish an 
appropriate link between local security elements and the military, and adapt force structures 
to judiciously selected areas. Additionally, this study determined that GIRoA should create 
training and employment regimens for local security elements that preserve their intended 
use as small, defensive forces and impose minimal disruption to community life. 
  
9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW—MILITIAS AND 
LOCAL SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN 
The current state of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) is 
such that they likely will not survive or adequately function without the direct support of 
the United States.10 Furthermore, the ANDSF is not large enough to effectively control 
Afghanistan’s expansive and challenging geography, especially in the more remote rural 
regions. According to the most recent Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) quarterly report (January 2018), the United States Department of 
Defense estimates 64% of the Afghan population is under governmental control or 
influence, while the insurgents own 12%, and 24% remains contested.11 Though difficult 
to validate such figures, assuming accuracy emphasizes the challenge in holding controlled 
areas and expanding influence with current resources. This challenge has spurred a great 
deal of debate regarding the potential development and employment of local security 
elements with supporters and critics from both Afghanistan and its allies. Those in favor 
of pursuing local security programs consider the option unavoidable and consistent with 
the structure of Afghan society. Others, however, view local security forces as a liability, 
creating militias that serve the objectives of regional warlords vying for power.12  
The argument for creating some version of localized security in Afghanistan largely 
focuses upon the tribal nature of Afghan society as well as the sheer size of the country in 
relation to the number and effectiveness of available security forces. Following the 
transition to NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in 2015, coalition presence was reduced 
as the Afghan National Army consolidated forces in prioritized locations, leaving security 
                                                 
10 Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience 
in Afghanistan, 115. 
11 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States 
Congress, January 30 2018 (Arlington, VA, 2018): 86, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2018-
01-30qr.pdf. 
12 Anna K. Jarstad, “Unpacking the Friction in Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform in 
Afghanistan,” Taylor & Francis, Peacebuilding, 1, no. 3 (September 2013): 384, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2013.813179.  
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vacuums, thereby exacerbating the issue.13 Though the Afghan people may benefit from 
basic services typically provided by a functioning centralized government, advocates assert 
that security should be partially decentralized to enhance legitimate governmental 
influence and complement regular ANDSF elements. An advantage to this enabling role, 
as highlighted by RAND in a study on local security forces throughout history, is enhanced 
intelligence collection capabilities.14 The level of understanding local forces have of the 
human and physical terrain surrounding their own homes far exceeds that of any external 
element conducting temporary security operations in their areas. The information gleaned 
from positive cooperative relationships with local security forces may better focus the 
efforts of the central Afghan government.  
The case for decentralized security also seeks to address longstanding ethnic 
tensions that exist throughout segments of Afghanistan. The current ANDSF model results 
in Afghan soldiers being sent to unfamiliar regions, potentially operating among ethnic 
populations different than their own and with whom historical friction exists. At the height 
of NATO presence, with fighting heavily concentrated in the southern and southeastern 
portions of Afghanistan, the majority of Afghan soldiers came from the north.15 Local 
forces may have more stake in the game, as their own families and villages suffer the 
consequences of failure. If properly employed, decentralized local security forces have the 
potential to contribute to the internal stability the United States and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) have sought for seventeen years. Critics, 
however, consider local participation a liability rather than a strength.  
There exists a strong, historically-based fear that pursuing a local security force 
program operating on the fringe of direct central government control will set the stage for 
greater instability. Analyzing previous attempts to implement such programs, Jonathan 
                                                 
13 Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience 
in Afghanistan, 113. 
14 Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryze Loidolt, and Todd Helmus, Locals Rule: Historical Lessons 
for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), 171. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1232.html. 
15 Najim Rahim and Mujib Mashal, “Afghan Army Recruitment Dwindles as Taliban Threaten 
Families,” New York Times, November 18, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-army-recruitment.html. 
11 
Goodhand and Aziz Hakimi warn of the dangers of local security forces in their article, 
“Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan.” With the intention 
of creating home guards to protect members’ villages and families from the coercion and 
violence of insurgent elements, such programs often devolve into enabling militias that 
exploit their power for predatory violence or personal gain.16 Through previous attempts 
at decentralizing security and reversing efforts to demobilize existing militias, the United 
States and the Afghan government essentially created a security market replete with 
competition and a lack of regulation.17 Instead of promoting stability by extending the 
reach and influence of the Afghan government, some local security initiatives instead 
injected destabilizing elements imparting various forms of illegitimate governance.  
Of the multiple local security programs implemented by the United States and 
GIRoA since 2001, critics most often refer to the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Created as 
part of an experimental United States Special Operations initiative in 2010, the program 
has expanded into a significant, though questionably effective, element of the Afghan 
security apparatus.18 This was done despite the reservations of senior Afghan government 
officials. Many believed, including at the time President Hamid Karzai, that the ALP 
resembled the militias that led to Afghanistan’s civil war in the 1990s as well as thwarted 
central government control.19 Additionally, all of the ALP’s predecessors had either failed 
or were abandoned due to perceived insurmountable challenges. The mixed record of ALP 
forces serves as a rallying point for both supporters and critics. Though the program 
experienced successes in certain regions of Afghanistan where conditions were favorable, 
many of the forces remain plagued by corruption, incompetence, and a lack of trust from 
the people they are supposedly protecting.20 Those opposing local security consider the 
ALP representative of the unavoidable issues inherent to militia-based security initiatives 
and warn of investing in future programs destined for failure. Regardless of past failures 
                                                 
16 Goodhand and Hakimi, “Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” 3. 
17 Goodhand and Hakimi, “Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” 6. 
18 International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” i. 
19 International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” ii. 
20 International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” ii. 
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and successes, the topic warrants continued research to better guide American and Afghan 
policy.  
Much of the research with respect to local security initiatives tends to focus on an 
“all or nothing” approach. Opponents focus on the inherent challenges and historical 
failures of previous initiatives, while advocates cite the inability of the central government 
to exert compete control. There appears to be room for a more hybrid approach that satisfies 
both sides of the debate and takes into account the distinct operating environments found 
throughout Afghanistan’s diverse human and geographical landscape. Rather than starting 
a new initiative from the ground up, further research and study may offer insight into 
shaping existing initiatives and only implementing them where conditions are favorable. 
Even the International Crisis Group, which is highly critical of the ALP, acknowledges in 
its 2015 report the danger of completely abandoning current local security programs and 
instead considers reform.21 
The concept of localized security forces remains a politically sensitive issue, and 
there has been little progress toward successful implementation. The tension between a 
burgeoning central government desperate to hold onto power and a predominantly rural 
society with tribal loyalties makes for an exceedingly complex environment. Given the 
political challenges of encouraging GIRoA to divest some authority coupled with the 
prevalence of violence in Afghan society, it is not surprising there is hesitancy for militia-
centric security propositions. Considering the United States has been deeply involved in 
Afghanistan for over sixteen years with little prospect of exiting in the near future, it is 
critical that the United States and Afghanistan break the cycle of repetitive and familiar 
action and start seeking more creative security solutions. If the United States does not 
advance more effective ways of achieving acceptable stability in Afghanistan without the 
presence of American forces, it will continue to expend blood and treasure in a stalemate 
for years to come.  
                                                 
21 International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” 25. 
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III. CASE STUDY—AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE 
The Afghan Local Police (ALP) program is the product of a United States Special 
Operations Forces initiative begun in 2010 and is currently a significant, though 
controversial, piece of Afghanistan’s security apparatus.22 The intent of the program was 
to encourage communities to protect themselves in the absence of adequate Afghan 
military and police presence. In theory, local Afghans joining the ranks would be motivated 
to protect their own villages and families and bring intimate knowledge of the region to 
assist other Afghan and coalition forces. There were a number of organic Afghan examples 
that played influential roles throughout the region’s history before the official 
establishment of the ALP, as well as similar American-initiated efforts during both the 
Soviet occupation in the 1980s and the current War on Terror. Subsequent chapters will 
address some of the more significant militia-based programs and informal organizations. 
To more narrowly focus on the ALP and its direct origins, this section begins with the 
program’s immediate predecessor to establish an adequate background for analyzing the 
ALP’s challenges, failures, as well as successes. 
A. HISTORY 
Following the end of the Cold War, the United States began to codify doctrine that 
shifted its counterinsurgency focus from being a purely military endeavor to one of a 
struggle for governance.23 As the American experience in Afghanistan and the Global War 
on Terror progressed, counterinsurgency doctrine morphed and became the foundation of 
United States military efforts. By 2009, American military leadership began to 
acknowledge the inherent challenges of imparting central government rule over a land 
where isolated rural communities functioned in a rather autonomous manner. Frustrated by 
the level of progress during the first eight years of war, the idea of expanding the official 
support and funding of irregular local security elements came to fruition.24 In keeping with 
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such principles, United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF), in conjunction with the 
Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), initiated and funded a pilot program in 2009 known as 
the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3).  
The AP3 began in Wardak Province with the intent of creating one to two hundred 
“guardians” in four districts with a cap of 1,200 personnel for the entire province.25 In 
theory, the AP3 were integrated into a security program with “four elements: deployment 
of U.S. troops that were part of the surge, training of locally based ANP (Afghan National 
Police) officers…, the recruitment of an AP3 cadre, and provision of development 
assistance from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).”26 Intimately 
familiar with the history of militias in Afghanistan and the associated risks, Afghan 
leadership within the MoI pushed to establish measures to exercise an acceptable level of 
control by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) as well as 
mitigate corruption. Ideally, the growth of AP3 would begin with a local shura (Afghan 
council) identifying recruits from the area whom the government would subsequently vet. 
These recruits would then receive training from USSOF, be paid by the MoI, and report 
directly to the district police chief, which, in theory, would prevent AP3 commanders from 
using their subordinate members for personal gain.27 As the AP3 program developed, 
American military leadership viewed it as an opportunity to change the course of the war 
and leverage its potential effects on the battlefield.  
In 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, commander of International Security 
Assistance Forces (ISAF) and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, initiated an assessment of the war 
that showed an increase in Taliban control over the country’s rural regions.28 Tasked with 
identifying rural areas conducive to establishing militias that would reverse this trend, 
Brigadier General Edward Reeder, commander of Combined Forces Special Operations 
Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), deployed U.S. and Afghan “special 
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operations teams to live and operate in villages that had decided to resist insurgents.”29 
Under the initial framework, “the militia had to number fewer than three hundred, be 
defensive, fall under the oversight of village jirgas, and be closely monitored by the Afghan 
government and NATO.”30 
Parallel to the AP3, the USSOF established a similar village-level security program 
in June 2009. Initially called the Community Defense Initiative and later renamed the Local 
Defense Initiative, the program sought to raise local defense forces without the 
involvement of the Afghan MoI due to its cumbersome bureaucratic processes.31 The 
program started in Day Kundi, Herat, Nangarhar, and Paktiya and placed USSOF in 
villages to directly interact with local leaders that chose to resist the Taliban.32 Concerns 
over the creation of uncontrollable militias persisted as USSOF continued to expand 
the program without expressed permission from Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president at 
the time. 
In 2010, General David Petraeus assumed command of ISAF and Brigadier General 
Austin S. Miller took charge of CFSOCC-A, which brought continued pursuit of village-
based security programs.33 Despite reservations about ceding power and control to 
potential warring militias, especially in non-Pashtun areas, President Karzai accepted an 
initial proposal of a 10,000-man force. President Karzai, however, would only permit the 
force’s establishment under the condition that the element be labeled a police force under 
the command of the interior ministry with a termination date two to five years from 
creation.34 The program was initially called “Village Stability Operations,” describing the 
expeditionary efforts to create village defense forces, and now officially named Afghan 
Local Police. Once established, the ALP attempted to absorb all other militias from 
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previous Afghan and U.S. programs, to include those under the Local Defense Initiative, 
legitimizing their existence and expanding their level of support. In a little over a year, the 
ALP grew to a force of 10,000 men spread across fifty-seven districts.35 
Similar to AP3 process, an ALP element stands up when village elders request 
assistance from the Afghan government and meet with representatives from MoI, the 
Independent Directorate for Local Governance, and elements from the U.S.-led Coalition 
at a shura. If validated, the MoI creates a tashkil (manning authorization) for the district, 
which typically allows for a maximum of 300 policemen per district distributed amongst 
the villages.36 Since the program intended to recruit ALP members from their communities, 
policemen serve part-time and continue working elsewhere, if desired. ALP fall under the 
same rules and restrictions as the Afghan National Police. They report directly to the 
Deputy District Chief of Police (Afghan National Police) and are partnered with U.S. 
forces, typically USSOF, as well as other Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
(ANDSF) elements.37 
Today, the ALP continues to be a significant part of the Afghan government’s 
security network. According to a January 2018 report from the Special Inspector General 
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Afghan government declared that as of 
November 2017, the ALP had 28,911 members, 24,858 of which had attended formal 
training.38 These ALP members were present in 199 districts distributed throughout 
Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces.39 Though the ALP program continues to receive 
support and funding from USSOF, it is not without criticism, as the history of the program 
is rife with examples of failure, abuse, and corruption. 
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A security element’s overall effectiveness and impact on the security situation of 
its assigned area of responsibility is a reasonable starting point in assessing the element’s 
worth. The ALP continues to struggle with the challenges inherent to establishing security 
in a predominantly rural and tribal society. The geographic location and cultural landscape 
in which an ALP unit is formed certainly matters, as Afghanistan’s diverse and 
ethnocentric society imposes challenges unique to each location. While some areas may be 
conducive to establishing an effective local security element, others may pose 
insurmountable hurdles. Assuming the Afghan government and USSOF properly select a 
location willing to provide ALP recruits and accept the unit, the ALP must still receive 
sufficient training, contend with an inadequate logistics system, and face enemy activity 
with the possibility of no reinforcements. These challenges may have resulted in significant 
casualties, as the ALP has suffered a disproportionately high number of dead and wounded 
when compared to other elements of the Afghan security apparatus. From its beginnings, 
the Taliban took particular interest in countering the ALP’s effectiveness, launching attacks 
and information campaigns specifically targeting ALP officers and the elders who backed 
them, leading to more ALP officers being killed proportionally than their Afghan National 
Army counterparts.40  
It is difficult to discern whether these casualties are primarily attributed to targeted 
enemy activity or some combination of minimal formal training and their persistent 
presence in the villages with constant exposure to insurgent activity. Such high attrition 
rates create a hurdle for recruiting and raise doubts about their proficiency, given their 
intended defensive posture. Without the prospect of guaranteed rapid tactical support from 
nearby military and police units and the lack of adequate material support, ALP officers 
may be inclined to serve local interests or yield to insurgent threats for the sake of survival.  
Aside from the documented abuses, which are addressed later in this chapter, the 
ALP’s effect on security remains questionable with only approximately one third of their 
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areas experiencing improved levels of security.41 This problematic impact on security is 
documented in a study by the Belgian International Crisis Group focusing on ALP 
performance in Kunduz Province in northern Afghanistan. At the introduction of the ALP 
into Kunduz in 2001, the province had approximately 200 to 300 members per district in 
four of its seven districts. By 2014, the program expanded with an additional 200 
authorizations in a fifth district.42 Despite the expanded presence of ALP throughout the 
province by 2015, Taliban elements were able to inflict significant casualties upon the 
ALP, imposing control and influence throughout much of the province. According to 
NSOCC-A, in Dashte Archi District alone, the reported strength of 278 assigned officers 
was reduced to 130 within six months of fighting in 2015.43 Further analysis of Kunduz 
during this time period points to a lack of correlation between ALP efforts and improved 
security. Of the districts containing ALP, four experienced a 25–30% increase in violence 
between 2010 and 2014, whereas the violence levels in the two provinces without any ALP 
presence remained constant.44 Though it follows that more fighting will occur with the 
existence of security forces opposing insurgent activity, the lack of improvement in peace 
over a four-year period and the staggeringly high ALP casualty rates point to an ineffective 
security system.  
Though overshadowed by reports of challenges and failures, there have certainly 
been examples of the ALP improving a community’s security situation, especially in 
Afghanistan’s most vulnerable areas. Kandahar Province in southern Afghanistan stands 
out as one of the more effective ALP locations in terms of both impact on security and 
capabilities. Through persistent incorporation into police and military operations, the ALP 
in Kandahar have been credited with preventing the Taliban from being able to expand into 
Kandahar City. This contribution to security, however, was achieved at the expense of 
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purely operating as a local defense force and instead augmenting offensive operations 
under the strict control of Kandahar police chief, Lieutenant General Abdul Razik.45 
The ALP in Kandahar have actively pursued the Taliban, though doing so revealed 
their propensity for violence and illegal activities. Despite the ALP’s successes in 
combating the Taliban in Kandahar, levels of violence increased in their districts. Five of 
Kandahar’s districts where ALP was originally implemented have had violence levels 
double, whereas violence was halved in the seven districts that never had ALP during the 
same timeframe.46 Likely contributing to this violence is the aggressive nature of the 
Kandahar ALP. Though Lieutenant General Razik’s strict code of discipline has largely 
averted the defection of ALP elements, it has not prevented them from regularly 
committing human rights violations in dealing with the Taliban. Widespread reports of 
torture and summary executions by Razik’s ALP have brought about mixed reactions by 
the community and the Afghan government.47 The ALP in Kandahar has clearly developed 
a reputation for proactively opposing the Taliban, though they are not without many of the 
same issues plaguing their counterparts throughout the rest of Afghanistan.  
The ALP program in its current form has not proven to be a widely effective 
security model. Though the concept and intent of the ALP has merit as a critical line of 
defense for geographically remote and vulnerable villages, the implementation of the 
program detracts from the desired effectiveness. The inherent challenges of employing 
local security elements are not adequately addressed by the current program and have 
created a security apparatus with minimal positive impact on the communities in which 
they are tasked to serve.  
C. POPULAR SUPPORT 
The varying levels of effectiveness as well as rampant abuse allegations make for 
wavering levels of popular support for the ALP across Afghanistan. Predatory behavior on 
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the part of the ALP as well as similar militia-based programs of the past have instilled 
distrust and fear amongst many Afghans. Instances of militias turning on their local 
communities or having their services unofficially sold to local warlords and powerbrokers 
further contribute to the Afghan people’s wariness of militia programs. Similarly, though, 
areas where ALP and other local security forces enhanced security without reports of abuse 
naturally promoted positive opinions among the community.48 This variance in impact on 
security and community acceptance largely rests upon the ethnic composition of a region 
as well as the local politics at play.  
When looking to the local politics present in the typical Afghan village, “the 
structure, composition, history, and insider-outsider relations all significantly influence 
how well-behaved a local self-defense unit will be.”49 The more homogenous and 
vulnerable to abusive Taliban activity a village is, the more likely it will support creating 
an ALP unit that increases the security level. This was the case in the early days of the 
ALP’s expansion when parts of Kandahar were requesting ALP prior to USSOF and the 
Afghan MoI starting to recruit in the region.50 Villages already suffering Taliban abuse 
were understandably willing to accept any form of security augmentation to improve their 
situations.  
Without the support of the local population, the ALP program cannot function. 
Given that the ALP recruits prospective officers from the local community in which they 
will serve, each village must have men willing to join the ranks with the approval of their 
elders. If the reputation of the ALP in the neighboring areas is one of abuse and 
incompetence, garnering the support of recruits and their communities poses a significant 
challenge. The current level of popular support for the preponderance of ALP units is not 
acceptable for the continuation of the program in its present form. The apparent 
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apprehension to accept the ALP in many communities across Afghanistan is telling of the 
program’s performance and relationship with the community.  
D. SUSTAINABILITY 
The longevity of the ALP hinges upon the Afghan government’s commitment to 
the program as well as continued support from the United States. The current state of the 
ALP suggests that the Afghan government may not be able to support proper maintenance 
of the ALP program should U.S. funds and advisors disappear. MoI’s ability to maintain 
tribal balance, ensure professionalism within the ranks, and properly vet recruits continue 
to be a concern.51 The question of commitment includes tactical support to the ALP officers 
at the local level. ALP officials remain dissatisfied with and skeptical of the quick reaction 
forces the local ANP and ANA elements are supposed to provide.52 If ALP officers lack 
faith in the government’s willingness and ability to provide combat reinforcement, the 
organization will continue to face challenges in operations and recruiting. 
Funding may be one of the most critical factors for the future of the ALP. The 
United States continues to fund the ALP with an estimated $96.6 million required to sustain 
the program during fiscal year 2018 in accordance with the 30,000-member cap, as reported 
by the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A).53 
Assuming these costs are necessary to the survival of the program in its current form, it is 
unlikely GIRoA could, or would be willing to, continue to independently fund the ALP. 
Afghanistan remains heavily reliant upon donors to sustain its government. Its low internal 
revenue generation combined with a myriad of other debilitating issues, such as insufficient 
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job creation, poor infrastructure, and struggling government capacity, make it unrealistic 
for GIRoA to prioritize the ALP and continue allocating funds.54 
The current logistical model of the ALP leaves the organization dependent upon 
U.S. support to properly function and mimics a system foreign to Afghan society. 
American advisors established a “pull” logistics system similar to most Western militaries 
in which the lower level recipients accurately account for on-hand supplies and request 
materials in accordance with projected needs.55 The Afghans currently lack the 
administrative ability and institutional experience to have such a model. A “push” system 
in which supplies are sent out on a schedule may be simpler and reduce administrative 
requirements, though it can lead to greater costs from distributing unneeded supplies and 
does not mitigate corruption. Additionally, the reduction in coalition forces across 
Afghanistan has further hindered logistical support, as the ALP were forced to more 
independently exercise their own underdeveloped communication and transportation 
networks.56 If the Afghan government cannot improve its logistics system, the ALP must 
adapt to operate in a manner that leverages local resources. 
Given its current funding source and support system, the ALP in its present form is 
not a sustainable option for Afghanistan. Without logistic and operational support from the 
U.S. military, the program will likely disappear. Furthermore, the lack of accountability 
for both equipment and personnel makes it exceedingly difficult for the ALP to maintain 
sufficient and functioning equipment to support continuous defensive security operations. 
Barring a change in prioritization from GIRoA and improved methods of logistical support, 
the ALP will not be a viable security option post-U.S. involvement. Though much of the 
ANDSF faces a similar prognosis, the ALP as a local security element should operate in a 
manner that requires minimal assistance.  
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E. GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
Though, in theory, the ALP program should produce forces committed to the 
protection and well-being of the local communities, reality shows less idealistic results. 
The history of the ALP demonstrates trends of corruption, abusive behavior, an inability 
of the Afghan government to exert control over the units, as well as the misuse by local 
Afghan powerbrokers.57 There have been numerous occurrences since the ALP’s inception 
of it operating outside the bounds of Afghan law and instead favoring ethnic identities and 
tribal loyalties. According to the 2018 SIGAR report, the ALP’s coalition advisors assessed 
that as of August 2017, 395 ALP officers were operating under the influence of local 
powerbrokers, serving their interests instead of securing their communities and enforcing 
Afghan law.58 Reported abuses range from extrajudicial killings to ALP checkpoints 
preventing certain ethnicities from passing or requiring illegal payments.59 
The absence of adequate government oversight of the ALP extends to personnel 
and equipment accountability. Specifically, the MoI’s lack of control over key personnel 
in command of ALP is a significant underlying issue affecting support shortcomings.60 
ALP officers not receiving their full pay due to superiors and MoI officials taking portions 
of their salaries has been a widespread concern since the ALP’s inception. Additionally, 
equipment and supplies easily go missing, making the ALP vulnerable to exploitation by 
regional warlords and the Taliban.61 Since the local district and provincial police chiefs 
work for their respective governors as opposed to maintaining a strong link to the MoI 
deputy minister of security, those chiefs “are able to exercise considerable discretion over 
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the provisioning of ALP.”62 District and provincial officials “have hoarded or diverted a 
significant amount of equipment and supplies intended for ALP guardians in villages.”63 
Such behavior only weakens legitimate ALP elements and adds to the power and corruption 
of government officials and regional power brokers. 
In recent years, GIRoA and the United States have employed control measures to 
mitigate the issues associated with loose government control over the ALP. As part of the 
2016 Bilateral Commitment between NATO’s Combined Security Transition Command – 
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Afghan MoI, GIRoA established a set of benchmarks and 
oversight mechanisms to address issues with personnel, pay, equipment, training, and 
misuse of ALP by local powerbrokers and other Afghan government entities.64 To ensure 
salaries only go to authorized ALP officers that actually exist, the U.S. military 
implemented a computerized personnel accountability system, only paying ALP officers 
that are validated in the system.65 As of 2017, 70% of ALP officers are enrolled in the 
system with 80% being paid electronically through mobile bank transfers.66 Although such 
measures focus upon accountability rather than performance, they assist GIRoA in exerting 
control and influence over the organization. If money is a motivating factor to exploit the 
system for personal gain, these mechanisms act as barriers to behavior detrimental to the 
ALP’s purpose. 
Efforts to formalize ALP service and ensure units are operating in accordance with 
GIRoA’s laws and intent are a step in the right direction, though they still fall short of 
achieving a professional and effective local security element. Because of the wide range of 
ALP units spanning the spectrum of government control, the ALP as a whole moderately 
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contributes to stability and degrading the Taliban insurgency. Without GIRoA further 
implementing mechanisms to maintain adequate control of the ALP, local security forces 
will continue to be susceptible to corruption and improper employment. 
F. CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
Despite being members of their local communities, ALP officers routinely face 
allegations of abusive behavior, preying upon the people whom they are supposed to 
protect. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan highlights the predatory 
behavior exhibited by the ALP in a recent study indicating that in 2017 alone, the ALP was 
responsible for fifty-five documented incidents causing 114 civilian casualties. 
Additionally, forty-five casualties were known to be the result of ALP officers purposefully 
targeting civilians for personal reasons.67 Though accidental civilian deaths are regrettable 
and jeopardize the trust and legitimacy of the ALP, the predatory behavior of ALP officers 
within their own communities may be even more damaging to local security.  
The criminal activity present within the ranks of the ALP has negatively impacted 
local governance in communities across Afghanistan. Reports of ALP extorting their 
communities, stealing land and goods, and imparting violence upon ethnic rivals have 
fostered a sense of fear and distrust of the ALP and other government-backed militia 
programs.68 Such criminal activity has even extended to the illicit drug trade. Given that 
illegal drugs contribute to a third of the Afghan economy, it follows that an under-regulated 
militia element reporting to corrupt government officials with drug smuggling ties would 
also become involved in this disruptive, though profitable, activity.69  
                                                 
67 United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 
(Kabul, Afghanistan: 2018): 49, 
https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2017_f
inal_6_march.pdf. 
68 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for Militias? Not so Fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police 
Experience,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27, no. 2 (March 21, 2016): 265, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129169. 
69 Felbab-Brown, “Hurray for Militias? Not so Fast: Lessons from the Afghan Local Police 
Experience,” 271. 
26 
The lack of legitimate oversight of the ALP has established an environment 
conducive to abuses and criminal activity. At the outset of the ALP, such oversight was 
primarily provided by USSOF elements living within close proximity to ALP units. These 
USSOF elements provided the supervision and training necessary to mitigate predatory 
behavior. With fluctuations in U.S. troop presence, however, many ALP elements lacked 
American oversight or fell under the purview of conventional American troops, who were 
not as suited for such a mission.70 The reduced American involvement coupled with an 
Afghan government plagued with corruption has allowed criminal behavior within the ALP 
to persist. 
G. LESSONS LEARNED 
The ALP experience provides numerous lessons for the United States and GIRoA 
to consider for the potential evolution of the ALP or future implementation of similar 
programs. The shortcomings and successes of the ALP highlight the associated costs and 
benefits of creating militia-based local security elements. Though far cheaper, less resource 
intensive, and faster to develop than formal conventional security forces, the expediency 
comes at a price. If the United States is to pursue the creation of such forces, whether it be 
out of necessity or convenience, it must do so understanding the short versus long-term 
consequences and implement control mechanisms up front to mitigate the anticipated 
challenges. 
Prior to standing up a local security element, the sponsor should consider 
accountability measures to punish or disband elements that become problematic or 
unnecessary. The lack of formal processes for disarming ALP units that exhibit predatory 
behavior within their communities has propagated the effects of rogue elements.71 The 
Afghan government’s inadequate control of both personnel and equipment has made it 
exceedingly difficult to recover weapons and encourage unwanted ALP officers to return 
to their normal civilian lives. Completely dissolving existing ALP elements without 
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creating groups of unemployed armed men ripe for Taliban recruitment may not be 
possible, though establishing control measures for future ALP and other security elements 
may mitigate such risk.  
The employment of local security elements must be tailored to each individual 
region and community. Initial successes of ALP in some areas encouraged the United 
States to rapidly expand the program and apply a generalized formula across various 
regions of Afghanistan. As demonstrated by the ALP experience, some communities were 
far more conducive to establishing local security elements than others. A multitude of 
factors affect location and implementation, to include: ethnic and tribal disposition of the 
area, geography, presence of other government security forces, history, and enemy activity. 
The sponsor must thoroughly assess a potential local security element location considering 
such factors, as well as working alongside local leaders, both formal and informal.  
Local security elements require a direct and trusted link to the central government 
to ensure acceptable control and prevent misuse by local powerbrokers. The structure and 
reporting mechanisms of the ALP have created an organization vulnerable to co-optation 
by nefarious elements and exploitation by corrupt Afghan government officials. 
Incorporating regular security forces personnel into key ALP positions can assist in 
coordination with the ANP/ANA and training. Though the opportunity for corruption and 
misuse remains, utilizing ANA personnel mitigates the risk, as they may not have any 
personal connections to the area, potentially offering relatively objective oversight. This 
should be done in a manner that avoids overpowering the ALP and does not diminish its 
perception and role as a community defense force. Furthermore, the ANA enjoy greater 
approval by the Afghan people; therefore, direct ties within the ALP may provide 
legitimacy as well as assist with tactical and logistical support.72 
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IV. CASE STUDY—INDIAN TERRITORIAL ARMY  
The evolution of the Indian Territorial Army provides an example with parallels to 
the American experience in Afghanistan following its intervention in October 2001. India’s 
internal unrest and global operational requirements during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries surpassed the capacity of both the occupying British force and the Indians, 
making the establishment of a local security element necessary. The result was the creation 
of a home defense force that could augment security while regular troops were committed 
to World War I, which developed into the Indian Territorial Army (ITA).73 The ITA 
remains in existence today, continuing to provide additional security for communities and 
assistance to the Indian Army when called upon.74 Given the similarities in the dynamics 
in which the ITA came to fruition and the current state of Afghanistan, the ITA presents 
potential lessons for the successful implementation of a similar concept in Afghanistan, or 
at least provides guidance to reform existing local security entities. The principles 
contributing to the longevity and professionalization of the ITA may prove worthy of 
application to Afghanistan while taking caution not to blindly mimic instances of success 
without paying proper attention to context and cultural variances.  
A. HISTORY 
The British have a long history of imperial conquest and establishing order in 
distant lands to maintain control over acquired territory and resources. Such experiences 
shaped the British approach to achieving stability in the geographically vast and highly 
populated country of India. British influence in India began through commerce and the 
global reach of its trading companies. By the mid to late 1700s, “the East India Company, 
operating out of London, was in the novel and highly ambiguous position of collecting 
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revenue and so administering a large and prosperous part of eastern India.”75 Those serving 
under the umbrella of the company found themselves integrated into India’s social and 
authoritative structure, laying the groundwork for the establishment of official British rule, 
known as the Raj.76 Until the mid-eighteenth century, the Moguls maintained stability and 
control over the Indian people. As their influence waned, especially in the more remote 
regions of India, regional politics became unstable and negatively impacted trade. 
Understanding the implications of political instability, to include the disruption of trade 
routes, the cutting of supplies from the source, and the threatened safety of commercial 
personnel, the British government decided to intervene.77  
Beginning in 1744, the British entered a series of conflicts with the French and local 
Indian factions challenging British economic interests in the region.78 By 1857, increasing 
unrest and mistreatment of the Indian people spawned violent resistance against the 
occupying British forces and merchants. The violence was mainly characterized by two 
conflicts: one pitting the British against their Indian auxiliaries, and the other categorized 
more as counterinsurgency operations conducted by small British detachments against 
rural Indian rebels.79 Determined to reestablish order and maintain control of its Indian 
territory, Britain committed 46,600 British troops and 58,000 loyal Indians to the conflict.80 
Instability in the rural regions of India remained a constant threat to British interests. Any 
removal or shift of British authority resulted in localized insurrections, highlighting the 
true lack of influence and control by the British and the Indian governance structure they 
supported.81 The British ultimately succeeded in suppressing the revolt in 1858 through the 
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brutal application of military force, resulting in the abolition of the East India Company 
and placing India directly under the rule of the British Crown.82  
Though the British were able to maintain their position of power through strict rule 
following the transition to the Crown, political opposition and the beginnings of unrest in 
the early 1900s prompted the British to shift methods to a more indirect and influence-
based approach.83 Lord Lytton, viceroy in India during the 1870s, demonstrated this 
sentiment, stating “we can hold India securely by what they call good government: that is 
to say, by improving the condition of the [people], strictly administering justice, spending 
immense sums on irrigation works, etc.”84 This marked a step towards the British seeking 
population-centric options to exert control rather than resort to pure force and intimidation, 
which may not provide sustainable or durable stability. 
In pursuit of a low-cost option to provide security and protect imperial interests, the 
British created the Indian Army, which was comprised of British officers and soldiers 
leading Indian troops.85 The British understood that control of the population hinged upon 
the ability to enforce law and dispense justice at the local level while maintaining a 
perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the Indian people. The Indian Army was constantly 
dispatched throughout rural India to augment civil authority and remind the people of its 
power, though doing so was expensive, unpopular, and at times not feasible due to limited 
numbers.86 In response to these challenges, the British attempted to rely upon civil police 
forces to maintain local security. These forces, however, proved ineffective, as they were 
largely disorganized and had a reputation for corruption and oppression. The British went 
a step further to strengthen the police through creating small armed reserves within each 
province that could respond to issues overwhelming the police, though these elements were 
eventually absorbed by the police.87  
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Britain’s attempts at local security were further strained as the world erupted into 
global conflict at the start of the twentieth century. Britain, and consequently its imperial 
forces, were fully committed to World War I from 1914 to 1918, pulling vast amounts of 
personnel and resources away from the homeland and its colonies. By the end of the war, 
“nearly 1 ½ million Indians had been recruited into combatant and non-combatant 
services,” with approximately 1,400,000 British and Indians being sent overseas.88 
Britain’s struggle to balance resource allocation for maintaining stability in its colonies 
while fighting a major war forced a new restructured approach to achieving local security 
in India. 
Formalizing attempts to provide local security during World War I, the British 
established the Territorial Army through the Indian Territorial Act of 1920, creating two 
wings: the Auxiliary Force for Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and the Indian Territorial 
Force for Indian volunteers. Following its independence from Britain, India officially 
retained the Territorial Army through the Territorial Army Act in 1948.89 Falling under the 
control of India’s regular army, the ITA remains an integral part of the Indian security 
apparatus and has made significant contributions to security, at home and abroad. In its 
current form, the ITA’s approximately 40,000 personnel serve to relieve the regular forces 
of static domestic duties, assist in civil administration, provide aid to communities struck 
with natural disaster, and may support the Indian Army in times of grave threats to 
security.90 
B. SECURITY/EFFECTIVENESS 
Similar to the efforts of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA) and the United States to achieve acceptable peace and stability across 
Afghanistan, India struggled to assert governance and control over its rural tribal areas. 
British officer accounts of operations entering the twentieth century describe them as 
achieving “little beyond demonstrating the muscle of the Raj,” with over six hundred raids 
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being recorded between 1899 and 1906 and no significant improvement in security.91 The 
area’s geography also presented significant challenges, as India’s northwest region is 
mountainous and was, at the time, largely uncharted. Acknowledging these issues, the 
British came to espouse that they could achieve stability and regional security through 
creating and working with locally recruited police and militia. They believed that such local 
“arrangements would, in time, eradicate disorder and finally lead to the area’s integration 
with more settled regions.”92 To better confront the challenges of instability, the British 
revised their frontier policy in 1901, replacing Anglo-Indian garrisons with locally 
recruited tribal militia serving under British officers.93 The British carried this model 
forward to create the ITA.  
Efforts to professionalize the ITA resulted in the evolution of a force capable of 
contributing to stability on the home front and augmenting Indian national security when 
called upon. From the inception of the ITA, the British, as well as the Indian government 
following its independence, recognized the necessity of professionalizing the local security 
elements. This became readily apparent during the First World War, as highlighted by the 
precarious security situation in India’s Northwest Frontier Province. With the majority of 
longstanding, well-established territorial units deployed to France, the remaining troops 
were largely inexperienced and lacked sufficient formal training.94 By 1915, the territorial 
troops operating in the Northwest Frontier Province were struggling to control the region, 
prompting the British to open the Mountain Warfare School. This school was specifically 
designed to centrally train Territorial Army officers and noncommissioned officers who 
could return to their units and share their knowledge.95 The effects of such standardized 
training translated into the continued development and markedly better performance of the 
ITA.  
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Through the expanded centralization and standardization of training, the ITA aimed 
to achieve levels of professionalism and knowledge similar to that found in India’s regular 
military units. Eventually, ITA soldiers began attending regional training centers and 
conducted local training in accordance with established Indian Army practices. Currently, 
ITA officers undergo ten weeks of initial officer training at the Indian Military Academy 
to ensure the ITA’s leadership is of similar caliber to their regular Indian Army 
counterparts.96 In doing so, the ITA became capable of effectively functioning 
independently to address local security issues and could serve under the command of the 
regular Indian Army in times of crisis.  
Recognizing the value of a local security program, especially in the early days of 
its existence as an independent state, India invested in the ITA’s effectiveness and its 
further development. The ITA’s history of contribution to achieving stability in India 
solidified its role as part of the larger security apparatus. The ITA in its current form 
continues to serve as a potential model for achieving local security in communities that 
span both urban and remote rural regions.  
C. POPULAR SUPPORT 
The truly local and part-time nature of ITA soldiers likely contributes to the ITA’s 
support from the Indian people as well as the longevity and legitimacy of the program. The 
ITA has officially been a part of the Indian security apparatus for almost one hundred years, 
and continues to be an accepted element within Indian society with participation across the 
country.97 From its official inception in 1920, the ITA as a new local volunteer force gained 
popularity in India’s more remote rural regions.98 Presently, ITA soldiers are assigned to 
units based upon established zones of responsibility, serving in units closest to their civilian 
places of work. The intent of determining assignments in this manner is to better allow ITA 
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soldiers to maintain focus on their civilian careers.99 Current ITA requirements only permit 
gainfully employed civilians to serve, as the organization purposely does not offer fulltime 
employment to its members.100 Consequently, the part-time status of ITA soldiers does not 
equate to wages substantial enough to live on, and normal duties do not significantly 
interfere with members’ civilian lives, making them very much members of their own 
communities.101 
Unlike members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), the ITA soldiers are forced to 
rely upon outside employment in their communities to support themselves and their 
families. Given the ITA intends to pose minimal disruption to community life and its 
members do not maintain legal authority while off-duty, enrollment in the ITA likely has 
little impact on the social acceptance or status of its members. Additionally, members of 
the police force are disqualified from serving in the ITA.102 This forces ITA soldiers to 
continue living as contributing members of their communities without maintaining a sense 
of authority over their fellow citizens when not performing duties in an official capacity. 
In practice, the ITA construct diverges from the ALP program in this manner. Though the 
ALP program originally intended for members to participate part-time, in reality, some 
members maintain permanent roles in their villages as ALP officers, unnecessarily 
wielding power and influence in their own communities and offsetting the balance of 
power.103  
The ITA’s long history of Indian citizens contributing to security along with 
sustained recruitment from local Indian communities is indicative of an aptly supported 
local security program.104 The ITA is not a conscript force, forcing the organization to rely 
on volunteers and support from the communities they serve. The ITA’s current 
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organizational model encourages valued service to the Indian people while retaining the 
popular support necessary to continue functioning as a local security element.  
D. SUSTAINABILITY 
The level of resources and support required to maintain the ITA is inherently less 
than that needed for regular security elements, creating a sustainable organizational model 
to complement security.105 The ITA was initially a low-cost option to expand British efforts 
to maintain control in India.106 This concept of supporting internal security without the 
expenses associated with maintaining a standing regular military unit continued after 
India’s independence. Preserving the ITA as a volunteer force with ITA soldiers only being 
paid when performing their duties eliminates the need to pay full salaries and logistically 
sustain units in between scheduled training events and operations.107 The ITA’s 
contribution to Indian security at a reduced cost continues to spur debate in which 
supporters call for further investment in, and the expansion of, the ITA. Doing so would 
allow the Indian government to maintain security while simultaneously freeing up financial 
resources for other critical projects.108  
The intentional minimal interference of ITA membership with civilian life allows 
for broad voluntary participation without significantly impacting Indian’s private sector. 
The modern ITA’s emphasis on continued contribution to society through its members’ 
civilian careers preserves this facet of maintaining a sustainable security model.109 This is 
a critical aspect of security force sustainability a government must consider. The Indian 
government’s attention to balancing the requirement to maintain a ready force sizeable 
enough to be effective with the need to support the economy demonstrates a forward-
thinking approach to enhancing a nation’s defense capabilities. Additionally, the minimal 
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impact on community life facilitates recruitment efforts to sustain the force and local 
defense capabilities, as there has been no shortage of ITA volunteers in recent times.110  
E. GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
The assignment of regular British and Indian Army soldiers to territorial elements 
ensured proper control and development of the ITA. Starting from the creation of India’s 
early local security elements, the British ensured the permanent presence of an experienced 
cadre within the ranks. This presence was formalized initially by attaching five British 
officers to each ITA battalion during training. British officers formed the command teams 
and filled critical roles with Indian officers falling under their charge.111 The direct 
oversight by regular British and Indian Army officers ensured the ITA operated above local 
disputes, as these officers were not indigenous to their operational areas. Such social 
separation of the key leadership insolated the ITA from the potential of unlawful influence 
and misuse of forces by local powerbrokers.  
Control over the ITA through professional military officers also ensured the ITA 
conducted operations directly in line with British and Indian government interests.112 
Rather than allowing each local security element to independently pursue its own 
objectives that may interfere with adjacent elements or produce results counter to the 
government’s interests, the presence of regular army officers helped to guide and 
coordinate efforts. These officers not only provided leadership and military expertise, they 
were also the direct links to the regular forces and the government, improving 
communication and situational awareness for higher commands.  
The inclusion of a permanent professional cadre marks a distinct difference 
between the ITA and the various local security programs implemented in Afghanistan. For 
example, ALP elements may interact with regular Afghan security elements, though they 
continue to lack a persistent professional presence or relationship. This lack of oversight 
                                                 
110 “Territorial Army Facing a Severe Shortage of Officers.” 
111 Singh, Territorial Army: History of India’s Part-Time Soldiers, loc. 1165. 
112 Brown, Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy, 95. 
38 
equates to mixed results in ALP effectiveness and professionalism.113 Though multiple 
factors certainly influence the performance and behavior of local security elements, the 
ITA’s inclusion of objective professional personnel in the organization’s critical leadership 
positions may assist in steering security elements towards activities and behavior that have 
a more positive impact on stability.  
F. CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
The part-time nature of the ITA may be a crucial factor in counteracting the 
propensity of militia-based security elements to pursue criminal activity. Because ITA 
soldiers must maintain civilian jobs to earn a living wage, any criminal behavior committed 
while serving in the ITA could jeopardize their civilian careers. Furthermore, ITA soldiers 
serve in the same areas in which they live. Unlike some fulltime ALP officers who 
embraced their elevated community status, ITA soldiers are only permitted to serve part-
time with intermittent training and employment. Given ITA soldiers spend the majority of 
their time as civilians in their communities, aside from legal punishment, there are social 
consequences to misbehavior.  
The ITA’s established vetting and selection process assesses the suitability of 
applicants for service, increasing the likelihood of accepting quality personnel and refusing 
entrance to potential or past criminals. Applicants must now pass the Preliminary Interview 
Board as well as the Services Selection Board. The Preliminary Interview Board consists 
of both written examinations and an interview, allowing military and civilian experts to 
evaluate an applicant’s personality, mental capabilities, and personal background. If 
successful, applicants then face the Services Selection Board, which also recommends 
select personnel for commissioning as officers.114 This process ensures some level of 
mental capacity for each applicant and provides the ITA with the ability to turn away 
applicants that may have a history of misbehavior or personality traits not conducive to 
working well with the Indian people and fellow ITA soldiers. Although standards of service 
comparable to that of a developed country’s military may not be feasible in Afghanistan 
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today, establishing a more stringent process for entrance into a local security organization 
may curb the trends of predatory behavior exhibited by elements like the ALP.  
G. LESSONS LEARNED 
The evolution of the ITA from local militias supervised by the British Army to a 
professional and permanent local security element within the Indian security apparatus 
highlights critical lessons for similar programs in Afghanistan. Though there are certainly 
cultural and circumstantial differences between India and Afghanistan, the principles for 
establishing local security exhibited by the ITA may guide implementation and reform in 
Afghanistan. The British and Indian governments’ efforts to establish control measures, 
professionalize the force, and encourage ITA members to maintain strong ties to their 
communities are all critical aspects of ITA effectiveness.  
Establishing durable control measures from a local security program’s inception is 
essential for maintaining government control. As demonstrated by the ALP, a central 
government attempting to reign in rogue security elements and implement control 
mechanisms after the appearance of pervasive control issues is challenging. If a 
government creates these mechanisms from a program’s inception, organizational culture 
and momentum may more easily institutionalize such practices. For the ITA, relying upon 
regular military officers to provide leadership and guidance untainted by local politics 
likely prevented ITA elements from becoming the personal militias of local powerbrokers. 
This concept has been largely lacking in Afghanistan’s previous local security initiatives, 
making it difficult for the government to adequately control militia-based elements like the 
ALP. Implementing this practice, however, must be done carefully, as a lack of sufficient 
local representation in respected positions may induce resentment or loss of legitimacy.  
Centralized and standardized training plays a significant role in the creation of a 
professional force capable of providing internal security. The ITA has evolved to training 
its leaders alongside their regular Indian Army counterparts and maintaining scheduled 
training periods for its units.115 This method supports the ITA in achieving capabilities 
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comparable to fulltime security elements and facilitates regular forces absorbing ITA units 
in times of need. Though the United States and GIRoA attempted to pursue centralized and 
standardized training at various points in the ALP’s existence, there has yet to be complete 
implementation across the organization, and the level of proficiency achieved during 
training remains questionable.116 Acknowledging the ITA has had a much longer lifespan 
to develop such processes and is not battling an ongoing insurgency, Afghanistan can still 
take steps to pursue such a model.  
Forcing local security members to serve part-time and continue living lives as 
members of their communities may prevent abuses and foster popular acceptance. If 
members of a local security element are permitted to retain power over their fellow 
community members at all times, opportunities for relationships to change and abuses to 
occur exist. The temptation for misbehavior may be too great for some volunteers. 
Implementing a mechanism to force local security members to continue contributing to 
their communities as civilians while remaining ready to address threats to security may 
reduce the criminal activity often associated with militia-based security models.  
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V. CASE STUDY—PERUVIAN RONDAS CAMPESINAS  
The Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (Communist Party of Peru-
Shining Path) is a Maoist insurgent organization that was most active in Peru between 1980 
and 1995.117 The internal unrest brought about by this insurgency was a trying time for 
Peru, as the people endured hardship while the government underwent a series of 
transformations and pursued multiple counterinsurgency strategies. Seeking to leverage 
traditional local security elements, known as rondas campesinas, the Peruvian government 
successfully incorporated these formations into the national security apparatus to 
eventually defeat the Shining Path.118 Though the rondas significantly contributed to 
ridding the country of its insurgents, their service was not without controversy due to 
abuses and their long-term social impacts on rural communities. As in Afghanistan, Peru 
faced a protracted insurgency with a central government that struggled for widespread 
control beyond the boundaries of its urban centers. Analyzing the effective employment 
and associated challenges of the rondas illuminates lessons learned for potential 
application to bolstering local security in Afghanistan.  
A. HISTORY 
The rondas campesinas have origins tracing back through centuries of Peru’s long 
tradition of rural societies raising their own local security elements. The term rondas 
campesinas translates to “peasant rounds” and far predates their role during Peru’s most 
recent struggle with communist insurgents. During the sixteenth century under Spain’s 
colonial rule, rural Andean communities embraced the use of rondas to provide local 
protection and justice outside the purview of the perceived illegitimate Spanish system.119 
The more modern rendition of the rondas appeared in the 1900s when the owners of 
Andean haciendas (large plantations) created security elements from their workers to 
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defend their properties from thieves and rival land owners.120 Such arrangements lasted 
until changes in the Peruvian government brought about a shift in the functions of 
haciendas.  
The evolution of the rondas was heavily influenced by the various forms and 
actions of the Peruvian government. Since Peru’s independence from Spain in the 1820s, 
the military has played a key role in politics and government with brief periods of civilian 
leadership running the country.121 This history of strong military influence significantly 
impacted governance and its relationship with the people. Immediately preceding the 
emergence of the insurgency between 1968 and 1980, the military-controlled government 
at the time, the Revolutionary Military Government, attempted to make sweeping social, 
economic, and political changes. Lacking sufficient resources for its ambitious plans, the 
government failed and returned power to civilian leadership.122 These changes included 
the Agrarian Reform of 1968, which affected the ownership and function of Peru’s many 
haciendas.123 The law prompted a shift in the role of the rondas, who began breaking ties 
with the haciendas and focusing on voluntarily providing security within their local 
communities to prevent violence and criminal activity in the countryside, namely cattle 
theft. By the 1970s, these informal peasant organizations spread throughout the entire 
Andean region and into the Amazon, serving their communities and fulfilling their 
“ancestral principles of communal work and solidarity.”124 Aside from providing some 
form of security and rule of law in Peru’s most remote regions, the true utility of the rondas 
became clear following the rise of the Shining Path. 
The Shining Path traces its origins back to the early 1960s in Ayacucho, a remote 
state in Peru’s highland region that historically received little attention from the central 
government.125 Leveraging an already growing attraction to communism, Abimael 
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Guzmán Reynoso, a professor at the National University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga, 
organized a student organization to promote radical Maoist ideology. Guzmán remained at 
the helm of his organization, which became the Shining Path, and expanded his militant 
group’s reach beyond the university where his Maoist ideology resonated in the 
surrounding poverty-stricken region.126 The Shining Path continued to clandestinely 
construct its political, military, and support networks leading up to 1980 when it “launched 
its self-declared ‘people’s war’ on the eve of the most open and democratic elections in 
Peru’s political history.”127  
At the beginning of Peru’s civil war, the Shining Path focused on the countryside, 
sabotaging economic infrastructure, assaulting isolated police outposts, and assassinating 
government officials.128 For close to three years, the Peruvian government underestimated 
the growing insurgency, devoting little attention and resources to the issue.129 The Peruvian 
government eventually committed its armed forces to the conflict in December of 1982, 
leading to two years of brutal and often indiscriminate military repression.130 The lack of 
effective government intervention and the increasing costs and abuses imposed upon the 
people by both the Shining Path and the government inspired villages to rely upon rondas 
for local security and justice. 
By the mid-1980s, the Peruvian government realized it could not defeat the 
insurgency through military might alone, so it significantly altered its counterinsurgency 
strategy and pursued efforts to co-opt and formalize the rondas. By training and equipping 
these local security elements, the Shining Path faced another frontline, experiencing a 
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diminished support and recruiting base.131 Efforts to further develop the rondas arose in 
1991 with congressional legislation directing their arming and training, organizing them 
into Civil Defense Committees (CDC) under the army’s control.132 The Peruvian 
government’s decision to leverage the rondas and bolster other capabilities, to include 
intelligence collection, showed evidence of success and eventually led to the capture of 
Guzmán in 1992. The Shining Path immediately started to crumble, and by 1994 posed 
little threat to the Peruvian government.133 The rondas campesinas continue to play a role 
in Peruvian society, contributing to security and conflict resolution in line with the 
traditions of rural Peruvian culture.  
B. SECURITY/EFFECTIVENESS 
Though the performance and capabilities of the rondas were not uniform across 
Peru, they were an integral part of the Peruvian government’s counterinsurgency strategy 
to defeat the Shining Path. The Shining Path drew its support from Peru’s most remote, 
rural regions. Initially, the Shining Path enjoyed and relied upon the favor of the peasant 
class, who were lured by promises of a better life and elevated social status. This support, 
however, waned as the Shining Path’s uncompromising Maoist ideology brought about a 
social structure inconsistent with Peruvian heritage and a political cadre using tactics of 
terror and intimidation to eliminate resistance.134 The increasing hardships imposed upon 
the people by the Shining Path, as well as the Peruvian government’s early tepid response, 
encouraged rondas to take responsibility for their own communities’ security. 
The organically developed rondas in Peru’s remote Andean region laid the 
groundwork for local security elements to confront the Shining Path and eventually gain 
the Peruvian government’s support. The first rondas to take action were far from 
adequately armed and trained to truly enhance security in their communities. Some rondas 
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had nothing more than slings, knives, and stones when opposing visiting Shining Path 
members.135 Though the rondas were certainly incapable of independently destroying the 
Shining Path in this manner, they inspired communities to resist by all means possible, to 
include denying sustenance, safe haven, and recruits. The rondas’ defiant actions instigated 
the Shining Path to employ methods of greater violence and abuse, further alienating the 
people. Consequently, the rondas attracted governmental support to continue pressuring 
the Shining Path and secure their communities. 
The decision of the Peruvian government in the late 1980s to view the rondas as 
potential tools in the counterinsurgency fight rather than guerrilla sympathizers was crucial 
to successfully adjusting its strategy. The government understood the rondas’ potential 
contributions in its rural areas as both sources of intelligence and as armed forces.136 The 
initial support to the rondas came in 1983 when the Peruvian Army informally encouraged 
rural villages to form rondas, which was well-received in the provinces of Ayacucho and 
Cusco, despite there being a strong insurgent presence.137 Initial successes gave way to the 
Rondas Campesinas Act of 1986 in which the Peruvian government legally recognized 
rondas as autonomous local security elements and began officially providing arms.138 The 
government’s support was critical in the survival of the rondas and their ability to match 
insurgent capabilities.  
Formal inclusion into the Peruvian security apparatus and efforts to professionalize 
the force enabled rondas to protect their communities and degrade the Shining Path. 
Seeking to expand the rondas’ impact and improve capabilities, the Peruvian government, 
led by President Alberto Fujimori, made rondas members of the Peruvian armed forces in 
1991.139 In doing so, the government organized rondas into Civil Defense Committees 
under the control of the army. With this construct, rondas received enough formal training 
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and arms to not only defend their communities, but also offensively pursue Shining Path 
elements operating in their areas.140 By 1993, there were more than 4,200 rondas elements 
throughout the Andean highlands with almost 236,000 members. At this strength, the 
rondas were often able to hold off Shining Path attacks long enough for the Peruvian Army 
to respond and destroy or repel the insurgents.141 
Overall, the rondas proved effective in their contribution to the Peruvian 
government’s greater counterinsurgency strategy. The organic nature in which rondas 
developed contributed to a local security element capable of fully integrating with their 
communities to deny the Shining Path much needed sources of support. The rondas’ desire 
to protect their families and properties from brutal Shining Path tactics meshed with the 
Peruvian government’s commitment to extinguishing the insurgency, which resulted in 
material and organizational support to the rondas.  
C. POPULAR SUPPORT 
The long history of rondas as part of Peruvian society and the local services they 
provided were sources of legitimacy and support from the people. The rondas originally 
emerged within rural peasant communities as a response to the central government’s 
inability to provide protection from criminal activity, settle local disputes, and administer 
swift and fair justice.142 The needs of these communities directly contributed to the rondas’ 
popularity and their increased involvement in community life. Initially, the rondas were 
merely a means of defending their villages from cattle theft and petty crime. As the 
Peruvian security situation grew more precarious, the rondas “evolved into local 
administrative authorities in the face of the state’s incapability in providing basic services 
in matters of the rule of law,” necessitating coexistence agreements with local 
authorities.143 The distant and often corrupt nature of the Peruvian government led rural 
communities to place more trust and confidence in their traditional, informal forms of 
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governance that functioned in a manner consistent with local customs and values.144 
Acknowledging this widespread sentiment and understanding the critical role of 
maintaining popular support, the Peruvian government chose to work with the rondas 
rather than continue relying solely upon government forces.145 
Though the expanded implementation of rondas contributed to heightened security, 
their disruptive impact on the traditional social structures of Peruvian society spurred 
mixed levels of support in some communities. By officially incorporating the rondas into 
the government security apparatus and providing formal training and authority to its 
members, Peruvian villages adopted a military logic that transformed daily life.146 Military 
training and tasks overshadowed the necessary and usual work associated with maintaining 
crops and estates. Contrary to previous practices, women were assigned responsibilities to 
contribute to security. Though their roles were often downplayed by their male 
counterparts, some women assisted through vigilance and patrolling while continuing to 
care for children, prepare food, and tend to animals.147 Even traditional social order shifted 
to accommodate military hierarchy. The young rondas commanders assumed positions of 
authority and influence typically reserved for the elder generation, causing the 
abandonment of traditional ruling in Andean communities.148 These changes to the fabric 
of Peruvian society called into question the institutionalization of the rondas system. Such 
grievances, though, were seemingly overshadowed by the proximate threat posed by the 
Shining Path. 
D. SUSTAINABILITY 
Considering the rondas’ organic nature and their contributions to local security 
throughout generations of Peruvian history, their continued existence requires minimal 
government resources to function at an acceptable level. The rondas’ early successes in 
                                                 
144 Palomino, “The Rise of the Rondas Campesinas in Peru,” 121. 
145 Kees Koonings, “Armed Actors, Violence and Democracy in Latin America in the 1990s,” Bulletin 
of Latin American Research 20, no. 4 (October 2001): 407, JSTOR. 
146 Mucha, “Securitisation and Militias During Civil War in Peru,” 335. 
147 Mucha, “Securitisation and Militias During Civil War in Peru,” 336. 
148 Mucha, “Securitisation and Militias During Civil War in Peru,” 335. 
48 
independently fending off Shining Path insurgents prompted the Peruvian government to 
supply only modest assistance to sustain the effort, at times only providing hunting rifles, 
vehicles, and small amounts of money.149 Such resources pale in comparison to the 
requirements of a professional standing army. The largely voluntary nature of the rondas 
also meant that most members were not paid for their efforts, as serving in rondas was a 
communal duty rather than a career.150 Even after the rondas officially became part of the 
Peruvian armed forces in 1991, the government did not have to allocate unsustainable 
levels of resources to retain the capability. The primarily defensive nature of the rondas 
allowed them to deter and resist Shining Path influence with relatively small numbers of 
villagers armed with rifles. 
The rapid spread of rondas across Peru is indicative of a sustainable program the 
Peruvian government may still rely upon in times of internal unrest. The catalyst for 
villages establishing new rondas varied. Some rondas formed organically as the result of 
peasant communities self-organizing for defense, while others were coerced into existence 
by the military or the rondas of neighboring communities.151 As Shining Path escalated its 
campaign of violence across the countryside in the mid-1980s, rondas increasingly formed 
without the pressure of external entities. Looking to the south-central Andean states of 
Aperímac, Ayacucho, Junín, Huancavelica, and Pasco, the region’s approximately 700 
rondas elements in 1989, grew to more than 1,200 in 1991. By 1997, Ayacucho and 
Huancavelica alone had 2,500 committees overseeing more than 120,000 personnel.152 
Regardless of motivation to join the rondas, the ability of the government and local rondas 
to recruit sufficient numbers of personnel for the counterinsurgency campaign is indicative 
of a society willing to maintaining this local security model.  
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E. GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
The Peruvian government’s decision to co-op existing ronda formations rather than 
create a new system resulted in an effective approach to local security and 
counterinsurgency, though doing so presented challenges of control. After official 
incorporation into Peru’s counterinsurgency strategy, many rondas continued to act in an 
autonomous manner. Efforts to exert complete control over them were “met with limited 
success, and patrol commanders took on local prominence in many communities.”153 Not 
only did this disrupt traditional social order, it provided greater opportunity for rondas to 
pursue objectives outside the scope of the Peruvian government’s campaign to defeat the 
Shining Path. Evidence of intercommunal violence began to appear in the early 1980s as 
rondas expanded and the Shining Path continued its movement. Though these communities 
may have been historical rivals, conflict did not typically rise to the level of violence seen 
when the rondas became more active in battling the Shining Path. The government’s 
program for co-opting and organizing existing rondas provoked greater resentment 
between villages not accustomed to interacting with each other.154 The existence of a 
common enemy in the Shining Path was at times not compelling enough to overcome the 
loyalties and grievances of the traditional rondas.  
Despite the inherent challenges of exerting absolute control over the rondas, the 
government’s actions to mitigate risk and channel efforts were sufficient in degrading the 
Shining Path. After officially taking responsibility for the rondas, the Peruvian Army 
created CDCs to establish order and hierarchical systems that could better integrate with 
the military. Upon identifying areas with active Shining Path elements and communities 
requesting military assistance, the army unit responsible for the region established a CDC 
command consisting of ten to fifteen peasants, providing them with training, weapons, a 
uniform, and an alias. The selectees then assumed responsibility for coordinating activities 
between the army and the rondas to defend against the Shining Path.155 These men 
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represented the government’s direct link to the population and militia activity. Once the 
CDC commanders were ready, the army registered their village populations, asking all 
residents to cooperate with the rondas and encouraged men ages fourteen to sixty to join 
the ranks. Each rondas element consisted of approximately forty to sixty men and, through 
the CDC, coordinated patrols with neighboring village rondas.156 The army’s interaction 
with the rondas through the CDCs facilitated the development of enhanced capabilities as 
well as provided the opportunity to influence action in the absence of continual government 
supervision.  
F. CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
Although rondas were effective and widely employed, evidence of misbehavior 
and abuse highlight the unintended consequences associated with utilizing militia-based 
security elements. By 1984, the rondas were very much involved in the conflict. Though 
primarily focused on defending their communities, the fighting at times resulted in the 
accidental killings of non-combatants, to include wrongful targeting.157 Due to the 
ambiguous nature of insurgents, paranoia and inaccurate information led some rondas to 
misidentify and kill innocent civilians suspected of being Shining Path members. Such 
accidents sometimes extended to unfamiliar Peruvian security forces, as demonstrated by 
an incident in Huánuco province in 1985 when rondas used machetes to kill three plain-
clothed police officers thought to be insurgents.158 Not all non-combatant killings were 
accidental, as the insurgency became an excuse for the unwarranted application of 
violence. 
The heightened role of rondas in Peruvian society during the Shining Path 
insurgency altered the typical means and consequences of local conflict resolution. The 
shift in rural Peruvian culture towards militancy, combined with the security vacuum 
created by the Peruvian government’s inability to secure the countryside, created an 
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environment in which disputes and personal grievances were settled through violence.159 
Traditional peaceful processes of conflict resolution exercised by informal village leaders 
and rondas became arguably barbaric in some areas. Rondas faced accusations of unjustly 
detaining and torturing suspected Shining Path members, forcing false confessions, and 
dispensing harsh public justice.160 These rondas elements were operating outside of 
Peruvian law with little consequence during this time, allowing for misbehavior that was 
not limited to violence. 
The remote nature of the rondas and their established ties to the military and 
Peruvian government created opportunities for corruption. The rondas’ newly formalized 
relationships with both Peruvian civil and military authorities led to all parties leveraging 
each other for illegal or self-serving means. For instance, some politicians used rondas to 
buy votes by handing out ammunition in return for support, promising future favors for 
rondas that influenced their villages to vote accordingly.161 The largely autonomous 
rondas overseen by an often-corrupt central government unsurprisingly resulted in some 
elements taking advantage of the system for personal gain. 
G. LESSONS LEARNED 
The rondas exemplify the concept of militia-based local security elements 
effectively battling an insurgency, though the price of employing such a model may include 
detrimental long-term social consequences. The rondas were certainly a critical aspect of 
Peru’s counterinsurgency campaign. Though their actions in confronting the Shining Path 
aligned with the government’s objectives enough to ultimately defeat the insurgency, they 
were not completely obedient proxies. Additionally, the Peruvian government failed to plan 
for their role and composition in a post-conflict environment.162 When establishing or 
permitting the existence of militia-based local security elements, a central government 
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must consider the costs and benefits of doing so. Leveraging militia formations to address 
an existential threat may prove necessary and decisive. Failing to plan for and mitigate the 
potential long-term effects, however, can inadvertently lay the groundwork for future 
instability and conflict.  
The Peruvian government’s decision to co-opt existing local security elements 
rather than impose a new system upon its rural population demonstrates the value in 
working through traditional customs to achieve stability. Like Afghanistan, Peru had a 
large rural population that relied upon local forms of governance, as the central government 
was often unable or unwilling to extend services and security to the countryside. The 
rondas had met the population’s need for security long before the appearance of the 
Shining Path. Already trusted by the people, the rondas proved to be a logical option for 
the Peruvian government to incorporate into their overall counterinsurgency strategy. 
Working within the context of existing culture, as opposed to forcing an unfamiliar system, 
increases the likelihood of popular support and allows for a more rapid and widespread 
employment of security elements. 
The official connection of the rondas to the Peruvian armed forces illustrates the 
importance of a central government establishing formal mechanisms and relationships to 
exert a modest level of control over local security elements. Though some rondas certainly 
strayed from the guidance of the Peruvian government, the majority operated in a manner 
suitable for achieving the ultimate objective of defeating the Shining Path. The rondas’ 
success and expanded capabilities was largely due to the organizational oversight and 
professionalization provided by the army. The Peruvian government’s approach to the 
rondas provides insight into how a central government can achieve sufficient control 
without undermining a local-security element’s legitimacy. Rondas received training and 
guidance from the Peruvian Army, though they were mostly permitted to operate 
autonomously. Although such autonomy at times resulted in abuses of power, it prevented 
many rondas from being perceived as puppets of a less-respected central government. As 
shown by the rondas, local security elements should have an appropriately established link 
to the central government to encourage faithful service and bolster effectiveness.  
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VI. CASE STUDY—AFGHAN ARBAKAI  
The concept of communities establishing their own security forces has long been 
imbedded in Afghan culture. As a rural tribal society, the Afghan people have rarely had a 
strong and capable central government that could reliably provide security and basic 
services. Born of this history and tradition were multiple versions of local security, to 
include the arbakai. Primarily a Pashtun approach to local security practiced in southeast 
Afghanistan, arbakai acted as volunteer police and defense forces at the behest of tribal 
governance.163 Though similar organic initiatives are present in other ethnic groups and 
regions of Afghanistan, this chapter focuses specifically on the arbakai due to its primarily 
defensive nature, alignment with cultural traditions, and divergence from the problematic 
militias controlled by warlords. Analyzing the arbakai’s function and historical 
contribution to stability provides lessons for the potential incorporation of traditional local 
security into the larger Afghan security apparatus.  
A. HISTORY 
Local forces have played a significant role throughout Afghan history, and in more 
modern times, various forms have both contributed to and detracted from Afghanistan’s 
stability. The term arbakai refers to organically-developed local security elements that 
uphold the laws and communal decisions of a traditional society. It is a broad title for such 
entities and does not include formal government initiatives or official security forces. 
Though the exact origins are unknown, arbakai have participated in community policing 
in southeast Afghanistan for centuries.164 Specifically, arbakai have primarily existed in 
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the Loya Paktia region, consisting of the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost, where 
strong Pashtun tribal systems exist.165  
Pashtun customary tribal code, known as Pashtunwali, heavily influences the 
actions of the arbakai, having greater impact upon the lives of Pashtuns than the laws of 
the central government. Pashtunwali has been passed orally from generation to generation 
and provides direction for social behavior as well as establishes laws to “guide decision-
making by all communal institutions, such as jirgas (tribal gathering), shuras 
(tribal/community council), and the arbakai.”166 The arbakai primarily exist to perform 
three functions: implement the jirga’s decisions, maintain law and order, and protect its 
tribal borders.167 Unlike standing militias, arbakai are ad hoc in nature and form as the 
result of a jirga directive to address a specific issue or threat, placing geographic and 
temporal limitations upon their existence.168 They also differ from militias in that they are 
defensive in nature and focus on matters of community, security, and the protection of its 
resources. They are inherently tied to a communal area and traditionally do not pursue 
offensive objectives beyond their boundaries.169 
Since the late 1800s, some Afghan rulers sought to harness the influence of such 
forces while others suppressed them. For instance, during his time in power from 1890 to 
1901, Abdur Rahman Khan made one of the first attempts to establish a national standing 
army, though he relied upon the local tribal elements in Afghanistan’s Pashtun regions for 
security. In doing so, Abdur maintained order and stability.170 Other governments, 
however, failed to understand the natural order of Afghanistan, seeking to achieve control 
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through strong central governance. Amanullah Khan, who ruled from 1919 to 1929, fell 
into this trap, striving to establish a central government similar to that of Ataturk’s in 
Turkey and Reza Shah in Iran. Amanullah’s ambition prompted rural societies to muster 
local forces and revolt, forcing him to step down from power as Afghanistan deteriorated 
into a brief phase of anarchy.171  
The unrest resulting from Amanullah’s abdication brought about a period of 
stability under Nadir Shah and his successors, Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan, collectively 
referred to as the Musahiban dynasty (1929 – 1978).172 Nadir Shah harnessed the influence 
of tribal forces, leaning upon them to seize and maintain power. Though Nadir did create 
a central government armed with strong security forces and a modern national army to 
confront large-scale conflicts and tribal disputes, he also continued to leverage arbakai and 
similar local security elements to maintain order through traditional tribal law. During this 
time, the Afghan government “used these systems as a form of indirect rule in areas where 
they lacked administrative capacity.”173 This practice and the special accommodations 
afforded to tribal governance was largely effective. The government permitted each of the 
major Pashtun tribes in southeast Afghanistan to supervise their own arbakai, providing 
“tribal authorities privileged status, property, money, advisory roles, and exclusion from 
military service.”174 The peaceful power balance between the central government and 
traditional tribal governance deteriorated as Afghanistan began its war against the Soviet 
Union. 
By 1978, communities had already begun mustering local forces to resist the 
Soviet-backed central government of Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded in 
1979, militias and local security elements supporting both sides of the conflict saturated 
the battlefield.175 Within the context of this complex and dangerous environment, 
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communities created arbakai for the sake of village protection. For instance, in Afghan 
refugee camps located in the Haripur area of the Pakistani North-West Frontier Province, 
refugees volunteered as arbakai to help maintain order and prevent abuses and theft.176 
Examples of such efforts continued through Afghanistan’s internal struggle with the 
Taliban. 
Following the start of the United States’ intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, 
arbakai once again appeared in the greater-Paktia region. The rapid toppling of the Taliban 
from power created a vacuum for local powerbrokers to exploit, laying the groundwork for 
instability. Within three days of the Taliban’s ousting, multiple communities within Paktia 
assembled a jirga consisting of leaders representing each sub-community level. The 
purpose of the gathering was to ensure the proper conduct of governance until the 
establishment of a new formal state. As a result, each community agreed to raise an arbakai 
element in accordance with the jirga’s guidance.177 Arbakai continue to be an accepted 
facet of Pashtun culture, serving their communities in times of need and guided by tribal 
customs and code.  
B. SECURITY/EFFECTIVENESS 
As expected of an informal, decentralized security organization, the capabilities and 
performance of arbakai vary among elements. The arbakai most successful in maintaining 
order operate in areas where the enemy threat is not overwhelming and the central 
government and its national security forces provide a quick-reaction force capable of 
supporting distressed elements in a timely manner. Additionally, successful arbakai 
originate from legitimate tribal institutions at the local level and remain small and defensive 
in nature.178 In conjunction with these conditions, geographic and cultural factors also 
contribute to the arbakai’s prevalence and success in southeast Afghanistan.  
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The arbakai’s long contribution to local security in southeast Afghanistan’s Loya 
Paktia region is due to the area’s relative isolation, thriving tribal institutions, and minimal 
presence of independent warlords. Geography has much to do with the physical isolation 
of Loya Paktia and the resulting survival of tribal traditions. The remote, mountainous 
characteristics of the region have made it particularly difficult for a central government to 
fully exert influence and replace tribal structures with state administration.179 When 
compared to the rest of Afghanistan, the southeast historically maintained a power balance 
largely driven by the influence of tribal leaders as opposed to the dominance of warlords 
leading personal militias. As a result, tribes more closely adhered to the code and customs 
of Pashtunwali, using arbakai for their intended purpose of providing local security and 
protecting their communities’ interests.180 Consequently, the region’s tribal system is more 
homogeneous and cohesive, contributing to more effective community policing.181 
Though arbakai have in many cases prove able to promote stability and local 
security, they do have inherent limitations due to their traditional customs, roles, and 
composition. The level of insurgent activity threatening a community significantly impacts 
the effectiveness of the arbakai, as areas predominantly controlled by insurgents are hostile 
environments that may surpass the arbakai’s ability to maintain security. This was apparent 
in the Loya Paktia districts of Gera, Serrai, Waza, and Shwak, where the Haqqani network, 
an organization closely tied to the Taliban, maintained strong influence over the 
community following the United States’ involvement after 2001, weakening traditional 
tribal structures.182 The arbakai are characteristically small and defensive. While typically 
adept at policing their local villages, combating large, well-established insurgent elements 
without assistance from government security forces can exceed their capabilities.  
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The Taliban’s realization of the threat posed by the arbakai and its concerted effort 
to diminish the arbakai’s influence demonstrate the true impact and value of an effective 
local security element. Despite the varying levels of competence across arbakai elements, 
they have long been a source of great concern to the Taliban. Local security elements that 
receive support and perceived legitimacy from their communities directly challenge the 
strength and veracity of the Taliban insurgency.183 These forces have the ability to inflict 
disproportionate harm upon the Taliban through their intimate knowledge of their 
geographic areas, their communities, the local Taliban networks, as well as the Taliban’s 
commonly used ambush and safe haven locations. Additionally, when confronted with an 
existential threat or ideology counter to their core beliefs, local forces tend to fight harder 
than their state security counterparts, as they are defending their own families and homes 
with no option for retreat.184  
The impact of informal and state-sponsored local security elements, to include 
arbakai and Afghan Local Police (ALP), prompted the Taliban to aggressively vilify, 
destroy, and even co-opt them.185 Initially, the Taliban viewed such forces as ineffectual 
and a negligible disruption to their operations. As the menace of their presence became 
evident, the Taliban resorted to heavy-handed methods and targeted information operations 
to destroy them and break their community ties.186 The Taliban’s aggressive approach, 
however, proved counterproductive, further promoting the adoption of arbakai and other 
local security elements. Consequently, the Taliban shifted toward a strategy based on 
influence, attempting to co-opt local security elements and their communities.  
The arbikai’s overall impact upon stability throughout Afghanistan’s history is 
indicative of an effective system with the potential for continued development. Despite the 
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arbikai’s limitations, their capabilities are likely sufficient for the Afghan government to 
rely upon with reasonable expectations and leverage where appropriate. Though typically 
unable to offensively pursue massed Taliban formations, the arbakai’s mere presence and 
utility in daily Afghan life is a valuable instrument in the current struggle against the 
Taliban. 
C. POPULAR SUPPORT 
The arbakai’s operational procedures, which are deeply rooted in Pashtun culture, 
create a local security apparatus that is legitimate in the eyes of their communities. Not 
only do arbakai contribute to local defense, they also play a key role in community conflict 
resolution. The arbakai are inherently tied to local tribal governance through the jirgas, 
obeying and enforcing their decisions. Jirgas traditionally provide quick decisions to 
resolve conflicts and implement culturally acceptable solutions, utilizing arbakai to ensure 
immediate compliance. In doing so, the community receives rapid, legitimate justice from 
a traditional institution, which is implemented through an organic and ever-present 
force.187 
The process by which men are selected for arbakai duties promotes community 
acceptance of the arbakai as a legitimate local security element representative of the 
people. When a jirga musters an arbakai, it draws men from the community whose elders 
called for the force. If necessary, the jirga may require each family to provide one man if 
able to do so. Though involvement with an arbakai is voluntary, the decision for a man to 
serve is made as a family or community, not as an individual.188 This communal approach 
to security ensures arbakai members do not become their own elevated caste of warriors. 
Rather, they perform their duties and return to their lives as villagers.189 Jirgas have even 
been known to practice a vetting process for potential arbakai members. Men considered 
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immoral or physically weak may be barred from inclusion in arbakai duties.190 The 
creation of arbakai elements through broad participation, shared hardship, and selection of 
trusted community members promotes acceptance and support by the villages they serve.  
D. SUSTAINABILITY 
The arbakai’s traditional role as an organic, local security element responsible for 
communal policing requires few external resources for sustainability. Participation in the 
arbakai is voluntary and its existence is ad hoc, so there is no guaranteed salary associated 
with membership. Additionally, the policing and defensive activities typically performed 
by arbakai do not require the advanced weaponry or resources vital to a modern army. 
Arbakai primarily receive funding and support through the jirga calling for the force. When 
the need for an arbakai mission arises, the jirga selects men and collects money from 
members of the community or tribe. Families that are unable to provide personnel or funds 
contribute through other means, such as offering food or assisting with other communal 
tasks.191 In doing so, community members share the burden of local security and have a 
vested interest in its conduct. To further cover expenses, the jirga permits arbakai to make 
use of money collected through fines for criminal punishment.192 Following this support 
model, arbakai eliminate reliance upon the central government to provide personnel and 
funds required for local security operations.  
Though the arbakai is a local voluntary force, the Afghan government has on 
occasion paid elements to perform specific tasks that benefit the state. For example, since 
2001, the Afghan government utilized discretionary funds to pay arbakai to assist with 
election security. The government worked through provincial governors who engaged with 
community leadership to ensure proper distribution of payments and control.193 Use of 
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arbakai in this manner was prominent “during the 2004 and 2005 presidential and 
parliamentary/provincial elections, when donors through the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the provincial governors paid the arbakai.”194 
Though such instances are not common, they do represent opportunities for funding and 
collaboration between traditional and state institutions to sustain an effective local security 
model.  
E. GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
Afghanistan’s central governments have historically recognized the arbakai’s 
potential contributions to stability in its remote regions, allowing communities to 
autonomously employ local security elements that pose little threat to the government. 
Traditionally, the central Afghan government exerted influence over arbakai when 
necessary through tribal elders rather than directly engaging with the local security 
elements.195 Maintaining relationships with the arbakai in this manner allowed for the 
central government to indirectly influence the arbakai’s contributions to security. 
Furthermore, this approach preserved the Afghan people’s perception of the arbakai being 
their force and not a proxy for the central government, which they may value less than their 
traditional governance structures. Collaborative efforts, however, have only been 
successful “when tribes and local communities believed in the central government’s 
legitimacy and felt confident that it could deliver the services required.”196 When these 
conditions have been absent, and interests do not align, communities turned solely to 
traditional governance and security mechanisms, at times offering support to groups that 
appear capable of providing such services and outperforming the central government.197 
Afghan culture and the current state of the national security apparatus present 
challenges concerning legitimacy and function when seeking to strengthen the Afghan 
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government’s control over the arbakai. Given the government’s centralized characteristics 
and endeavor to establish modern rule of law, attempts to exert complete control over the 
arbakai have been at odds with traditional institutions, which predate the current Afghan 
government.198 This is exemplified by the Afghan Local Police program, which attempted 
to mimic and formalize the arbakai concept, even incorporating existing arbakai elements 
into the force.199 Issues of control and legitimacy quickly arose. Accountability for ALP 
action shifted away from the traditional control mechanisms governing arbakai to the 
distant state, which lacked the presence of local governance institutions. Ironically, state 
attempts to directly oversee local security elements, to include arbakai, introduced factors 
that reduced control, fostered instability, and degraded the central government’s legitimacy 
in some areas.   
F. CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
The traditional accountability mechanisms incorporated into the arbakai system 
mitigates the risk of criminal activity associated with local security forces. Arbakai are held 
accountable for their actions through both upward and downward-oriented means. Looking 
upward, arbakai answer to the jirga that called for its creation, which is responsible for 
providing guidance and leadership.200 As for downward accountability, arbakai are 
compelled to maintain the trust and favor of the people they serve. Jirgas are comprised of 
community members and often operate in a transparent manner when making decisions 
and supervising arbakai. The people’s understanding of the distinct responsibilities of the 
jirga as a decision-making body and the arbakai as the entity that implements said 
decisions brings clarity to the accountability process.201 Furthermore, the people’s material 
support to the arbakai bolsters their influence, as arbakai may receive equal financial 
shares from all members of the tribe for their service. Consequently, the people have greater 
ownership over the arbakai, and it is in the best interest of the arbakai members to avoid 
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alienating their community through criminal activity. Additionally, arbakai members 
maintaining equal social status while serving also serves to strengthen accountability, as 
there are no social barriers for fellow community members to seek justice should 
misbehavior occur.202  
Despite the existence of traditional accountability measures, some arbakai 
elements are guilty of abuse and human rights violations. Arbakai and similar militia-based 
local forces were especially problematic during Afghanistan’s civil wars of the 1990s. 
During this time, militias engaged in atrocities and abuses that tarnished the reputation of 
local security elements, to include the arbakai.203 Evidence of misbehavior continued 
through Afghanistan’s post-2001 period with arbakai and other local security elements 
being accused of exploiting their communities, stealing land and goods, and committing 
violent crimes, to include murder and targeting rival ethnic groups.204 Due to the unofficial 
nature of the arbakai and other local security elements, it is difficult to acquire exact data 
measuring the prevalence of such criminal activity. Notwithstanding, communities 
continue to turn to arbakai to provide security and their version of justice.  
The arbakai provide traditionally legitimate justice in their communities, though in 
doing so, concerns of human rights abuses arise. Given arbakai are guided by tribal 
institutions and customs, their practices are not always compatible with the Afghan 
government’s laws. This leads to situations that raise human rights and legal issues for 
arbakai, specifically in the realm of individual and women’s rights.205 Punishments and 
methods of conflict resolution decided upon by a jirga, and carried out by arbakai, are 
potentially acceptable in their local communities, but they may cross the threshold of what 
the Afghan government or its sponsors are willing to tolerate. Though local communities 
might not classify such activity as criminal, the government may contend otherwise.  
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The risk of misuse by influential community members and co-option by nefarious 
elements remains when relying upon arbakai to provide local security. Under the umbrella 
of traditional tribal structures, dominant elders may attempt to manipulate arbakai to 
pursue their own interests, such as settling personal and community feuds or obtaining 
resources. For instance, communities in Khost province stood up arbakai to prevent Kuchi 
(Afghan nomads) from accessing what they viewed as their territory.206 This is less of a 
security issue and more of a competition for land. In some cases, the Taliban have also 
managed to influence and recruit arbakai for their cause.207 For example, in 2014 the 
Taliban began an information campaign in Ghazni District to convince local security 
members to “come in from the cold,” assuring them and their families that they would be 
welcomed by the Taliban.208 The Taliban reinforced their messaging and attempts to co-
opt local security elements by staying true to their guarantee of safety and even holding 
celebrations honoring Afghan security personnel that turned their backs on the Afghan 
government in favor of the Taliban. Though the Taliban continue to target local security 
elements in many areas, overall, trends point to them taking a less violent approach to 
degrading their threat and winning their support.209  
Despite instances of misuse and co-option, arbakai have largely operated in an 
acceptable manner while serving their communities. When considering their widespread 
use within the Loya Paktia region, “the arbakai appeared relatively free from the corruption 
of the militias and apparently effective at preventing Taliban encroachment.”210 
Furthermore, their persistent use by Pashtun tribes over hundreds of years is itself 
indicative of their actions remaining within their communities’ tolerance for permissible 
behavior. 
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G. LESSONS LEARNED 
Successful instances of arbakai implementation demonstrate the importance of 
balancing the inclination for the central government to exert control with the necessity of 
maintaining local legitimacy. The concept of Afghanistan as a nation-state is relatively new 
in its long history of tribalism and ethnic division. These conditions created a society that 
perceives local, traditional governance as more valuable, effective, and legitimate than 
Afghanistan’s historically weak central government. This being the case, the arbakai 
exhibit the need for the central government to provide them with a reasonable level of 
autonomy, maintaining influence through ties with traditional local governance structures. 
When done successfully, the central government was able to rely upon local governance to 
assist with accountability. In doing so, the government did not become too heavily involved 
in local matters and avoided diminishing the arbakai’s legitimacy in the people’s eyes. 
Such an arrangement can even bolster the central government’s legitimacy and influence, 
as the Afghan people will likely create arbakai when necessary, regardless of the Afghan 
government’s laws. Additionally, studies indicate that when faced with disputes, 80–90% 
of Afghans prefer traditional resolution over the government’s judiciary system.211 Failing 
to formally accommodate such activity creates a situation where the government risks the 
perception of being undermined or ignored by its own people.  
Attempts by the central government to enhance local security element capabilities 
potentially risk inadvertently perverting the traditional system and diminishing 
effectiveness. Recent efforts to professionalize some arbakai elements and formally 
incorporate them into the national security apparatus, as demonstrated by the ALP 
program, have been largely counterproductive. Doing so shifted loyalties and 
accountability away from the community to a weak central government, creating forces 
rife with criminal activity and members abusing their elevated social statuses. Although 
there is certainly benefit to the government taking steps to improve local security elements’ 
capabilities, effective arbakai demonstrate the importance of the government assisting 
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without significantly altering their traditional nature, which is to be defensive, ad hoc, and 
closely tied to local governance.  
Arbakai are successful under specific social and security conditions, therefore 
broadly implementing a program in its exact image nationwide may not achieve the desired 
stability. The ALP and its immediate predecessors again demonstrate this point. These 
programs looked to the arbakai as a model for application across Afghanistan. In these 
cases, the Afghan government and its advisors applied a blanket approach to establishing 
local security elements without a full appreciation for the cultural and organizational 
factors that have allowed the arbakai to work. Historically, arbakai are most effective in 
areas with strong traditional tribal structures and communities with the means to 
independently resist insurgent threats.212 Though overarching principles exist, the details 
of local security execution must be thought through within the context of the current 
operational environment and cultural norms of a specific location. 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Afghanistan’s culture, history, and precarious security situation all contribute to the 
need for effective local security elements that can protect their communities without 
challenging the survival of the central government. The Taliban’s widespread insurgency, 
coupled with the remote and isolated nature of many Afghan communities, make it nearly 
impossible for GIRoA to secure the population and achieve stability with the current state 
of its national forces. Though some ANDSF elements operate in an expeditionary manner 
to address insurgent threats in remote regions, such operations are often short in duration 
and lack holding forces that can remain in areas to maintain and exploit gains. Local 
security elements can effectively fill this void if properly developed and employed. 
Through the application of an analytical framework to four separate cases (see Table 2), 
this study identified lessons for the incorporation of local security elements into a nation’s 
larger security apparatus.  
Table 2. Local security element assessments by evaluation category 




Campesinas Afghan Arbakai 
Security/Effectiveness Poor Desired Desired Acceptable 
Popular Support Poor Desired Acceptable Desired 
Sustainability Poor Acceptable Desired Desired 
Government Control Poor Desired Acceptable Acceptable 
Criminal Activity Poor Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable 
 
There is no standard blueprint or universal solution to local security that can 
adequately account for all variations in culture and circumstance. There are, however, 
principles that likely contribute to success and warrant consideration when utilizing local 
security elements. While the principles for local security elements apply to Afghanistan, 
the country’s complex operational environment may necessitate adaptation for specific 
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areas. The following principles address the creation or reformation of local security 
elements in Afghanistan, to include the burgeoning Afghan National Army Territorial 
Force. 
A. PRINCIPLES FOR LOCAL SECURITY  
(1) Incorporate traditional governance structures into local security element 
employment. 
Afghanistan’s history of weak central governments has preserved the importance 
and legitimacy of traditional governance structures. Failing to accommodate this deeply 
imbedded facet of Afghan culture when establishing local security elements greatly 
diminishes popular support and effectiveness, as demonstrated by the Afghan Local Police. 
GIRoA should formally incorporate traditional governance entities, such as shuras and 
jirgas, into local security element functions. This would require granting traditional 
governance an acceptable level of autonomy and permitting them to utilize security 
elements within the bounds of established guidance and law. Such an arrangement would 
involve GIRoA primarily communicating with local security elements through traditional 
governance structures, offering respect and legitimacy to these culturally significant 
entities while avoiding the perception of local security elements becoming “puppet” forces. 
Through this relationship, GIRoA can influence local security element activity and 
preserve local customs, creating forces that contribute to stability and operate in a manner 
that directly serves their communities. Surrendering direct control of local security 
elements may meet resistance within GIRoA, though doing so could promote legitimacy 
and popular support for both the security elements and the government.  
Elevating the role of traditional governance ensures local security elements remain 
accountable to their communities through established social mechanisms that influence 
acceptable behavior. If local security elements receive guidance, resources, and punitive 
action through their traditional leadership, they may be compelled to behave in a manner 
in line with communal values. The arbakai demonstrated this principle, as decisions and 
guidance for local security elements were made by communities in a transparent manner, 
discouraging members from engaging in abuse that jeopardized their social statuses. 
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(2) Establish an enduring relationship between local security elements and the 
Afghan military to influence behavior, maintain accountability, and 
enhance effectiveness. 
One of the greatest advantages local security elements have is their intimate 
knowledge of their communities and environments. With this local expertise, however, 
comes the risk of elements pursuing tribal or personal objectives incongruent with 
legitimate security objectives. It is necessary for the central government to maintain regular 
communication and contact with local security elements for the sake of passing guidance, 
receiving intelligence, and coordinating efforts with state security forces. The Afghan 
military may be the most appropriate link between GIRoA and the local security elements, 
as it remains one of the more respected entities in the Afghan government.213 The continued 
presence of Afghan military personnel can assist GIRoA in establishing a productive 
relationship with local security elements that provides outside influence potentially 
removed from local issues or biases.  
The strength and composition of a link between the central government and local 
security elements heavily depends upon culture and the legitimacy of both traditional 
governance and the state. Given the value of traditional governance and community in 
Afghanistan, GIRoA must avoid establishing an overbearing relationship. While the British 
were successful in filling most of the Indian Territorial Army’s critical leadership positions 
with regular British and Indian Army officers, such a practice may not be appropriate in 
Afghanistan. Forcibly placing regular Afghan National Army personnel directly in charge 
of local security elements may foster resentment and lead to the Afghan people viewing 
security entities as unwelcome forces unjustly imposing the central government’s will. A 
potential approach could entail Afghan National Army Special Forces primarily interacting 
with local security elements, as they are likely the best suited for the task given their years 
of experience working with American special operations advisors. Such a relationship may 
involve Afghan Special Forces teams being centrally located to multiple local security 
elements and regularly training and operating with them. As local security elements 
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develop, Afghan Special Forces soldiers can serve in permanent liaison positions within 
each element, allowing for persistent influence without commanding elements.  
The persistent presence of the Afghan military would provide a formal 
accountability mechanism to address misbehavior in conjunction with traditional systems. 
Having a clearly defined process for controlling and holding local security elements 
accountable encourages members to operate within the bounds of Afghan law and allows 
for GIRoA to have greater influence over their behavior and impart disciplinary action for 
infractions. A critical component to any accountability process is the presence of honest 
government officials willing to utilize the established system to provide just guidance and 
impose fair punishment for violations of established law. To be effective, the Afghan 
military itself must be generally free of misbehavior and hold the people’s respect. If 
consistent and impartial in promoting Afghan law, the military can demonstrate a 
legitimate function on behalf of the central government and garner popular support. 
Aside from issues of control, a direct link between local security and the Afghan 
military assists with developing capabilities and providing operational support. The 
Afghan military can oversee the development of defensive military skills as well as 
facilitate coordination for necessary resources. Additionally, close ties with the military 
can equate to emergency tactical support, providing reinforcements to local security 
elements in danger of defeat by insurgents. Such support can bolster confidence and 
recruitment while demonstrating the central government’s commitment to securing the 
population.  
(3) Utilize training programs to enhance local security element capabilities that 
focus on defensive operations with minimal disruption to community life. 
For a government to expect local security elements to defend their communities, it 
has to invest in their development. In the cases of both the Peruvian rondas campesinas 
and the Indian Territorial Army, standardized training run by regular security forces greatly 
improved local security performance. The state must consider the costs and benefits 
associated with bolstering capabilities, however, and take care not to drastically alter the 
intended nature of local security elements as community defense forces. Local security 
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elements tend to be most effective in serving their communities when they remain small 
and defensive in nature.214 Institutionalizing elements in the mirror image of regular state 
forces may diminish the ties to their communities, as demonstrated by the Afghan Local 
Police. Large-scale centralized training programs that pull volunteers away from their 
homes for extended periods may prove unnecessary and counterproductive. Though the 
ALP program has generally failed to contribute to local security, its attempt to establish 
regional training centers is worthy of continued development.215  
A potential model for Afghanistan may call for local security elements to attend 
regional training centers for short periods with the majority of training being led by Afghan 
National Army Special Forces within the communities. Training in this manner imposes 
minimal cost to community life and allows elements to learn on the terrain they will defend. 
This method may also offer adequate standardization of capabilities and allow GIRoA to 
broadly communicate the expectations and legal limits associated with service in a local 
security element. The Indian Territorial Army experienced success through standardized 
regional training centers and minimizing disruption to communal life, allowing the 
program to develop into an element more closely resembling a national guard or reserve 
force.216 Though Afghanistan may not be ready for a local security program congruent to 
the ITA’s current scale, adopting the Indian training concept could prove beneficial.  
(4) Tailor the composition and function of local security elements to judiciously 
selected areas. 
Afghanistan is ethnically and culturally diverse and therefore requires an adaptable 
approach to local security. Given Afghanistan’s tribal nature and history of local security, 
co-opting existing tribal security structures may be more effective and expedient for 
fostering stability. As demonstrated by the Peruvian rondas campesinas, relying upon 
familiar communal security systems facilitates rapid expansion if necessary. Enhancing 
existing capabilities and organizations may prove more advantageous than developing a 
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new system. Allowing communities to maintain familiar and customary systems can also 
contribute to popular acceptance and greater participation. GIRoA can develop local 
security element capabilities and maintain influence through similar principles of 
employment throughout Afghanistan without imposing a standard structure. 
Prior to creating or adopting a local security element, GIRoA must conduct a 
thorough analysis of the cultural factors as well as the overall security situation. 
Historically, local security elements in Afghanistan have been most successful in its more 
ethnically homogenous areas where local security members are recruited from and operate 
among their own communities.217 Additionally, the security levels of a given region impact 
the likelihood of success for a local security element. Local security elements are small, 
defensive, and are not professional troops. Expecting communities to stand up in the face 
of overwhelming enemy activity may prove costly and diminish the chances of future local 
security element recruitment and employment. Instead, GIRoA should look to contested 
areas where communities have already resisted insurgents or expressed a willingness to do 
so. Ideally, these sites have regular troops operating in the area that are capable of 
supporting local security elements. For insurgent-controlled areas, committing regular 
troops first to degrade enemy strength may be necessary.  
(5) Employ local security elements part-time to mitigate social disruption. 
Establishing conditions for service in a local security element that are conducive to 
members maintaining their community roles fosters acceptance of the force. The Indian 
Territorial Army exemplifies this principle, as its members are not permitted to serve full-
time and are expected to maintain employment within their communities.218 This practice 
mitigates the risk of members achieving an elevated social status and inappropriately 
imposing authority upon their communities. Failing to prevent local security elements from 
leveraging their positions can lead to misbehavior, as demonstrated by elements of both 
the rondas and the Afghan Local Police. Additionally, part-time service minimizes the cost 
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of participating and may assist with recruitment, as members can volunteer without 
jeopardizing personal and family affairs. For Afghans residing in rural communities, which 
is the majority of the population, the notion of part-time employment may seem 
inconsequential.219 The people’s perception of power, however, matters for social order. 
The Afghan military link to local security elements should influence adherence to duty 
schedules to avoid having members pursue permanent positions of authority within their 
communities.  
B. U.S. MILITARY’S ROLE 
Efforts to develop a local security program must be Afghan-led, though the U.S. 
military has an important role for such a program’s initial employment and monitoring. 
Just as Afghan Special Forces should be the lead in this endeavor, USSOF should assume 
responsibility for advising local security implementation. Initially, small teams of 
Americans will need to accompany Afghan Special Forces as they recruit, train, and 
employ local security elements. The concept is reminiscent of Village Stability Operations, 
though in this instance, Afghan Special Forces are directing the program with American 
advisors influencing the application of the above principles, increasing the likelihood of 
creating effective local security elements that avoid the pitfalls of the Afghan Local Police. 
Close partnership at the tactical level during the early stages of a program will allow the 
United States to shape the establishment of enduring systems that contribute to stability 
and promote U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the additional combat power 
and logistical support associated with U.S. presence may prevent early catastrophic failure. 
As local security elements develop capabilities and solidify their relationships with GIRoA, 
the U.S. can reduce its footprint, maintaining influence and situational awareness through 
its connections with the Afghan military and intelligence networks.   
                                                 
219 United States Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Afghanistan.” 
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